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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: AN AFFIRMATIVE
LIMIT ON THE COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER OF
CONGRESS-A DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION
Joseph John Jablonski, Jr.*
I deem [as one of] essential principle[s] of this government and consequently [one of] those which ought to shape its administration . . . [tihe

support of the State governments in all their rights, as [th]e most competent
administrations for our domestic concerns, and the surest bulwarks against
anti[-]republican tendencies ....
Today's federalism debate concerns such emotionally charged issues as
the extent of the change in federal-state relations wrought by the Civil War

Amendments, 2 and whether the Constitution, in any of its provisions or
amendments, contains any judicially enforceable affirmative protection for
the states from the federal government. 3 It is, in a certain respect, as

fundamental as the Framers' debates in the steamy Philadelphia summer
of 1787, and the animated ratification debates which followed. Indeed,
nothing less than the fate of federalism law, as an effective means of
adjusting the problems of "an indestructible Union .. .of indestructible

* University of Pennsylvania, B.A., 1981; University of Pittsburgh, M.A., 1983; University
of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1987; Law Clerk to the Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1987-88. I am grateful to the editors of the DePaul Law
Review for their editorial assistance, and for giving me the opportunity to publish this article
at this time. I am especially thankful to Professor David M. Skover of the Indiana University
Law School for the insights and helpful comments he shared with me. I am grateful to Professor
Gregory Gelfand, now a visiting Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh Law School
for his comments and suggestions, and to Professor George D. Brown of the Boston College
Law School, for his thoughts and insights. Above all, I express my thanks to Judge Boggs for
giving me the privilege and honor of serving with him.
1. FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (March, 4 1801), reprinted in, 8 P. FORD, THE WRITINGS OF
THoMAs JEFFERSON 4 (1897).
2. The extent to which U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV have augmented the
federal government's power over the states is a fundamental constitutional issue. Do the states
at this juncture in American constitutional history have any judicially enforceable rights against
the federal government? Did the Framers of the Civil War Amendments intend to preserve a
judicially protectable province of state sovereignty on which a balance of power between the
states and the federal government could rest? For different approaches, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) and Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and FourteenthAmendments,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1469 (1975).
3. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O'Connor,
J.,dissenting) (quoting C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30 (1963)) ("The
issue ... iswhether the federal system has any legal substance, any core of constitutional right
that courts will
enforce.") (emphasis in original).
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States," '4 and the role of the Supreme Court as the ultimate guardian of
that union, 5 are at stake.
In the midst of a substantial body of critical commentary, 6 the Supreme
Court has struggled in recent years to define the nature and effect of two8
7
constitutional provisions of state sovereignty: the tenth and eleventh
amendments to the Constitution of the United States. After the 1985
decision of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 9 the
tenth amendment no longer bears much vitality as a limit on the federal

government's power over states. 0 However, Atascadero State Hospital v.

4. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
5. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court cannot abdicate
its constitutional responsibility to oversee the Federal Government's compliance with its duty
to respect the legitimate interest of the States.").
6. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987) ("[T]he
Court has misinterpreted the Federalist Constitution's text, warped its unifying structure, and
betrayed the intellectual history of the American Revolution that gave it birth"); Baker,
Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 139, 140 (1977) ("[l]nflexibility
and confusion ... now characterize eleventh amendment analysis."); Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515
(1977) [hereinafter, Field, Part One]; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203,
1279 (1978) [hereinafter, Field, Part Two] ("The distortions that have been imposed upon ...
the eleventh amendment from the outset ... are evidence that an erroneous view of the
amendment has prevailed."); Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1983) ("As a historical matter [the Court's]
view of the [eleventh] amendment is mistaken."); Nowak, supra note 2, at 1414 ("The confusion
that surrounds the [eleventh] amendment is, in large part, a result of the failure-by both
courts and commentators .... "); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation,
Taxation and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. 682, 688 (1976) (Court has "exhibited a schizophrenic approach").
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (5-4 decision); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. See Welch
v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Trans., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (5-4 decision) (Powell, J.,
announced the judgment of the Court in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White & O'Connor, JJ.,
joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). See also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985) (5-4 decision); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (5-4
decision); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (5-4 decision).
9. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (held that Congress had transgressed no constitutional limit on its
power under the commerce clause in extending to employees of municipal mass-transit system
the minimum wage and overtime protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), amended
by 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1974)).
10. In Garcia, the Burger Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
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Scanlon," decided later in the same year,' 2 suggests that the Court has
summoned the eleventh amendment, which limits federal court jurisdiction
over state government,' 3 to serve as one4 of the most effective provisions
of state sovereignty in the Constitution.'
While Atascadero arguably clarified and strengthened the eleventh amendment in favor of state government,' 5 it raised the next major federalism
issue: whether, and in what way, the eleventh amendment affirmatively limits
Congress's commerce clause power in the wake of Garcia's virtual obliteration of. any tenth amendment protection for states; 6 or more specifically

833 (1976), and apparently substantially reduced the tenth amendment's practical effect in the
federal system. See generally Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The
Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HAuv. L. REv. 84 (1985) [hereinafter Field, Demise];
Freilich, The Demise of the Tenth Amendment: An Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions
Affecting ConstitutionalFederalism, 17 URB. LAW. 651 (1985); Van Alstyne, The Second Death
of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985); Comment, National League of Cities OverruledSupreme Court Rejects Tenth Amendment as an Affirmative Limitation on Congress' Power
Under the Commerce Clause, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 277 (1985); Note, National League of
Cities v. Usery Overruled: States No Longer Immune From Federal Commerce Clause Power
in Areas of Traditional Governmental Functions, 14 STETSON L. REV. 786 (1985); Note, The
Changing Landscape of Federalism: The Supreme Court Rejects National League of Cities and
Affirmative State Rights in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 28 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 445 (1985). Cf. Schwartz, National League of Cities Again- R.I.P.
Or A Ghost That Still Walks?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 141 (1985).
11. 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (held that eleventh amendment barred private damage suits against
states in federal court arising out of the Rehabilitation Act (1973), amended by 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1982), whether the Act represented an exercise of the spending clause power, or the
fourteenth amendment enforcement power).
12. Garcia was decided on February 19, 1985, Atascadero on June 28, 1985.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XI: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
14. After Garcia the Court continued to strengthen state sovereignty, but in the eleventh
amendment context. See Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth, 74 GEO. L.J. 363 (1985) [hereinafter, Brown,
State Sovereignty]. Cf. Field, Demise, supra note 10, at 115. Professor Merritt has recently
written an intriguing and excellent article arguing that the guarantee clause, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, section 4, may be developed into an effective limitation on federal power over states. See
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism For a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988).
15. See infra notes 412-508 and accompanying text. See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra
note 14, at 363. For an article predicting the antithesis of what has in fact happened to the
eleventh amendment, see Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55
IND. L.J. 293 (1980).
16. See Skover, "Phoenix Rising" and Federalism Analysis, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271,
298-303 (1986) [hereinafter, Skover, Phoenix Rising]. Professor Skover has written a particularly
incisive and helpful analysis of the nature and dynamics of federalism doctrine. ("Now that
National League of Cities has been overruled by Garcia, it is an open question whether the
Eleventh Amendment imposes a second condition to suit against a state in federal court under
congressional commerce legislation, namely, that a state must have independently consented,
either expressly or constructively, to Congress' policy of immunity waiver."). Id. at 301 (footnote
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phrased, whether Congress may "abrogate" 1 7 a state's eleventh amendment
immunity in an exercise of the commerce clause?
In the most recent significant eleventh amendment case after Atascadero,
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,8 the
Court explicitly reserved judgment on the issue.' 9 The earlier cases of Parden
v. Terminal Railway Company ° and Employees v. Department of Public
Health and Welfare,2' did not clearly address the issue of congressional
power under the commerce clause to abrogate eleventh amendment protection
for state government, and since then, the Court has not been forced to
22
confront this issue.

omitted). See also Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-ProtectiveJurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment,
and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court,
71 VA. L. REV. 343, 392 (1985) [hereinafter, Beyond Pennhurst]; see also Brown, State
Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 365.
17. In this article, the issue of Congress's power to abrogate is "not congressional power
to legislate, but the effectiveness of a congressional grant of jurisdiction despite the eleventh
amendment's limitation on Article Ill." United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1343
n.1 (3rd Cir. 1987). The particular issue in this article is whether Congress, in an exercise of
the commerce clause power, may compel a state to defend a private damage suit in federal
court, despite the eleventh amendment. In eleventh amendment analysis, the term "abrogation"
is indeed confusing. For example, that Congress intends to abrogate the states' eleventh
amendment immunity by authorizing private damage suits against them in federal court, does
not necessarily mean that their eleventh amendment immunity has been "abrogated." See e.g.,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974). Moreover, that "when acting pursuant to § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the
States' consent," Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238, would seem to imply that at least in some
circumstances Congress cannot "abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States' consent." The nagging question is whether, and in what circumstances, independent state action
is a necessary predicate of eleventh amendment analysis for determining whether abrogation
has occurred. In other words, is "abrogation" unilateral in some circumstances, but bilateral
in others? For purposes of this article, the congressional authorization of private damage suits
against states in federal court is assumed to be equivalent to the congressional authorization of
federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states. Either form of authorization is
assumed to express Congress's intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment.
18. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (held that, in an exercise of the commerce clause power, Congress
had not spoken clearly enough in the face of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, to effectively
authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states, and thus had not expressed
intention to abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity).
19. Id. at 2946.
20. 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (held that by operating railroad in interstate commerce twenty years
after Congress enacted the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60,
Alabama constructively consented to congressionally authorized federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits against it based on FELA, and thereby waived its eleventh amendment immunity).
21. 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (held that Congress had not spoken clearly enough in enacting the
1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., to
effectively authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states).
22. See Skover, Phoenix Rising, supra note 16, at 301-03. Professor Skover suggests that
it is still an open question whether the cases of Parden and Employees will give rise to an
affirmative limitation on Congress's power to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity after
Garcia. See 411 U.S. at 298 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result). There, both Justice
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Shortly after Welch, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Union Gas
Company23 ("Union Gas II"), relying on the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Matter of McVey Trucking, Inc., 24 answered the longstanding question in
favor of congressional power, and adopted what has been called the "congressional supremacist 25 view of the eleventh amendment. Union Gas I

Thurgood Marshall and Justice Potter Stewart seemed quite satisfied with such a limit, and the
practical result of forcing private plaintiffs with damage claims against the state into state
court. See also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (1986) ("The
extent to which the eleventh amendment restricts other Congressional powers has not yet been
determined.").
23. 832 F.2d 1343 (3rd Cir. 1987). This litigation began with a suit brought in federal
district court by the United States against Union Gas Company under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1982)
("CERCLA" or "Superfund Act"), which sought recoupment of expenses related to the cleanup of toxic waste seepage into Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania. Id. at 1345.
Pennsylvania and the United States performed a joint clean-up under an EPA order, and the
United States reimbursed Pennsylvania for all of its expenses. Id. After the United States filed
its complaint in federal court, Union Gas Company filed a third-party complaint against
Pennsylvania, charging that Pennsylvania's negligence had contributed to the toxic waste
seepage. Id. Union Gas Company sought damages payable from the state treasury. Pennsylvania
moved to dismiss on eleventh amendment grounds, which the court granted. Id. Thereafter,
the United States and Union Gas Company settled the principal action. Id. Union Gas Company
then appealed the district court's dismissal of Pennsylvania as a defendant. Id. In United States
v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3rd Cir. 1986) ("Union Gas I"), a divided panel affirmed
the district court. In Union Gas I the court held that Congress had not intended to authorize
private damage suits against states in federal court in the Superfund Act. Subsequently, Union
Gas Company filed, on October 8, 1986, a petition for certiorari which the Supreme Court
granted. On October 16, 1986, the President signed certain amendments to the Superfund Act.
Thereafter, in Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 107 S. Ct. 865 (1987) ("Union Gas H"), the
Supreme Court vacated the decision, and remanded the case "for further consideration in light
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA], Pub. L. No. 99499." Id. at 869.
On remand, the Third Circuit in Union Gas I determined that the SARA Amendments,
particularly §§ 9601(20)(D) and 9620(a)(1), evinced unequivocal congressional intent to authorize
private damage suits against states in federal court. 832 F.2d at 1349. Convinced that the
Superfund Amendments were passed pursuant to the commerce clause, the court then addressed
the underlying fundamental constitutional issue of whether Congress possessed the power to
remove the eleventh amendment immunity of state government in an exercise of the commerce
clause, id. at 1350, and held that Congress possessed such power. Id. at 1356. Pennsylvania
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which the Court granted on March
21, 1988. It should be noted that the Supreme Court would not necessarily have to reach the
constitutional power issue if it determines, contrary to the Third Circuit, that §§ 9601(20)(D)
and 9620(a)(1), or any other relevant portion of the Superfund Act, do not evince clear
congressional intent to authorize private damage suits against states in federal court. Id. at
1348-50. This article, however, discusses only the constitutional power issue raised by Union
Gas I.
24. 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987) (when Congress acts pursuant to the bankruptcy clause,
art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4, it is exercising a plenary power; thus, Congress possessed power to compel
a state to defend federal court private damage action based on Bankr. Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §
547(b); court was more broadly convinced that Congress possessed such a power for any of its
plenary powers, despite the eleventh amendment).
25. H.

FINK

& M. TUSHNET,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND

PRACTICE

152 (1984).
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held that Congress, in an exercise of the commerce clause, possesses the
constitutional power to compel a state to defend a private damage suit in
federal court, despite the eleventh amendment.2 6 If the Court affirms Union
Gas II,27 it will have determined that the Constitution contains little, if any,
affirmative limitation on federal power over states, and perhaps no state
sovereignty with any "legal substance"; 21 the Court will have significantly
impaired its ability to resolve disputes between the federal government and
the states. In this author's view, eleventh amendment doctrine provides a
basis for reversing Union Gas II, despite the tenth amendment's demise in
Garcia.
Highly charged constitutional drama is likely to ensue in resolving the
issues presented in Union Gas II because of the deep divisions over federalism
issues within the Supreme Court. 29 Confrontation between supreme legislative
and supreme judicial power at one level, and federal and state power on
another level, will also necessarily be involved. Heightening the drama
surrounding these issues is the presence of recent commentary predicting
that the Court will "back down" from a challenge to the congressional
supremacist position, and "despite Atascadero, . . . abandon the concept of
limits generated by the eleventh amendment." ' 0 In referring to eleventh
amendment based limits on congressional power to compel states to defend
private damage actions in federal court, and current eleventh amendment
doctrine more generally, Professor Amar has passionately pronounced that
'3 t
"[alll of this, is, in a word, nonsense."
While Garcia may have removed the possibility of an affirmative limitation
on congressional power grounded in the tenth amendment, Justice Blackmun
provocatively suggested that there may be other bases for affirmative limitations on "federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." 32
Professor Schwartz has recently stated that "[i]f, as the Garcia opinion
recognizes, there are limits on federal action affecting the states, those limits
are meaningless if they cannot be enforced by the courts." 33 Atascadero, in
this author's view, suggests that the Court intends the eleventh amendment

26. 832 F.2d at 1356.

27. The Supreme Court granted Pennsylvania's petition for certiorari on March 21, 1988,
and is scheduled to hear oral argument in the case, now named Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., No. 87-1241, on October 31, 1988.

28. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
29. A minority of the Supreme Court consisting of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens is highly critical of current eleventh amendment law.
30. Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 365.
31. Amar, supra note 6, at 1473.
32. 469 U.S. at 556. Justice Scalia quoted this language from Garcia with emphasis in his
concurrence to the recent tenth amendment case of South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355,
1369 (1988) (Scalia, J. concurring), suggesting that Garcia's impact on affirmative limitations

on federal power over states might be containable. In his strong dissent in Garcia, Justice
Powell also noted this interesting aspect of the Garcia Court's opinion. 469 U.S. at 564 n.7.
33. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 165.
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to live a life of its own, quite apart from the tenth amendment.34 The
eleventh amendment may very well be one judicially enforceable affirmative
limitation."
Before the recent changes in its composition, the Supreme Court was
seriously concerned with developing an eleventh amendment state sover6
Consistent with this author's reading of Atascadero,
eignty, despite Garcia.1
and eleventh amendment law more generally, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 7 suggests
8
the Court's intention to reject the congressional supremacist position. An
eleventh amendment affirmative limit on Congress's power may justify the
Garcia dissenters' position that the judicial protection of state sovereignty
interests is an essential part of the Constitution. 9 Garcia, in that case, might
be called into question by eleventh amendment doctrine.
This Article argues that current eleventh amendment doctrine, which has
not yet adopted the Wechsler thesis40 as Garciahas for the tenth amendment,"

generates a basis for an affirmative limitation on Congress's power under
the commerce clause. 42 To be sure, Supreme Court eleventh amendment
doctrine governing Congress's power to grant jurisdiction to the federal

34. See infra notes 412-508 and accompanying text.
35. But see Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 380-419 (arguing that any notion of state sovereignty
beyond merely procedural is rendered impossible by Garcia).
36. Before the recent changes in the membership of the Supreme Court, the majority
supportive of current eleventh amendment law was essentially composed of the Garcia dissenters,
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist, Powell and O'Connor, with the addition of Justice
White. Justice Scalia appears tentatively willing to support eleventh amendment doctrine, see
Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2957-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
However, in dissent in Webster v. Doe, 56 U.S.L.W. 4568, 4573 (1988), Justice Scalia stated
that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity-not repealed by the Constitution, but to the
contrary at least partially reaffirmed as to the States by the Eleventh Amendment-is a
monument to the principle that some constitutional claims can go unheard." Whether Justice
Kennedy will be inclined to strengthen the formidable eleventh amendment legacy left by Justice
Powell is an open question.
37. 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (held that Congress possessed constitutional power under the
fourteenth amendment enforcement power, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, sec. 5, to compel a state
to defend private damage action in federal court, and thus to abrogate the eleventh amendment
immunity of states; at issue were the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
38. Id. at 456 (while Congress may remove state's eleventh amendment immunity in an
exercise of the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, it would be "constitutionally impermissible in other contexts").
39. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 566-67 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist
& O'Connor, JJ.).
40. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
41. 469 U.S. at 553-56.
42. In a separate article the implications of Garcia and the Wechsler thesis for an eleventh
amendment based state sovereignty are analyzed. See Jablonski, Does Garcia Preclude an
Eleventh Amendment Affirmative Limitation on the Commerce Clause Power of the Congress?,

23 U.

RICH.

L.

REV. 1

(1988).
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courts over state government has been problematic. Problems stem from the
apparent contradiction between language suggesting that Congress's power
to create federal court jurisdiction over private damage suits against states
is absolute,4 3 and other language suggesting that Congress's power in this
respect is limited by a state's right to consent independently to that federal
jurisdiction." Other problems concern whether, and in what way, Congress's
power under the fourteenth amendment enforcement power may be distinguished from its powers under article 1.41 Still other problems derive from
the tension between the repeated affirmance that the eleventh amendment
confers a "constitutional" immunity, 46 and the suggestion that Congress
may nevertheless "lift" that immunity. 47 However, these doctrinal problems
are not insurmountable.
There is another debate within the ranks of congressional supremacy that
Union Gas II noted 48 but did not enter: whether in-state private suits and
federal question private suits are properly within the scope of the eleventh
amendment. In support of Justice Brennan, Professor Amar has argued
vigorously that neither in-state private suits nor federal question private
suits are part of eleventh amendment immunity.4 9 If these suits are not
within the eleventh amendment's scope, an affirmative limitation on Congress's power to grant federal jurisdiction over state government would be
much less important. The debate here stems not so much from confusing
language in current cases, as from whether there is historical, textual and
structural foundation for the inclusion of those suits within the amendment's scope.
This Article proposes a synthesis of eleventh amendment law not seen
anywhere in the academic literature on this amendment. Its goal is to
stimulate further thinking and scholarship on the eleventh amendment. It
suggests that eleventh amendment law may be profitably viewed as a unity
based on the states' constitutionally guaranteed immunity from compulsory
private suit in federal court. Instead of distinguishing the amendment's
limitations on the federal courts from those on Congress, as Professor
Tribe" and Union Gas II in reliance on him have clearly done, this Article

43. See, e.g., Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-92.
44. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974) (Court held that Congress had not
authorized private damage suits against states in federal court in the federal-state program

called Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, or in any provision of the Social Security Act,
and thus Congress had not intended to abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity;
however, Court suggested that even if Congress had intended to abrogate the states' eleventh
amendment immunity, some form of independent state consent would be necessary to abrogate
that immunity).
45. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-53. See also Nowak, supra note 2.
46. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2949, 2952; Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240, 241, 242.

47. See, e.g., Employees, 411 U.S. at 283.
48. 832 F.2d at 1353 n.8.

49. Amar, supra note 6, at 1474.
50. Tribe, supra note 6, at 693.
51. 832 F.2d at 1353.
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advances a more unified view of eleventh amendment doctrine. In response
to Justice Brennan and Professor Amar, 52 this Article argues that there
may be justification for inclusion within the eleventh amendment of suits
54
by in-state private plaintiffs" and private suits based on federal questions.
Part I of this Article reviews the essential nature of Union Gas II, and
two camps of congressional supremacy.55 Part II generally discusses the
56
unity of eleventh amendment law. It argues that Hans v. Louisiana
5
9
establishes the existence of a "broad," 57 "stable,"" "constitutional''
limitation on original federal court jurisdiction over compulsory private
damage suits against state government. 60 The derivation of an affirmative
limitation on Congress's power to create such jurisdiction would be defensible in terms of: Hans v. Louisiana;61 the Court's historical view of the
amendment and Justice Iredell's dissent in the famous case of Chisholm
v. Georgia;62 the "constitutional" status of eleventh amendment immunity; 63 the complex relationship between article III and the amendment;

64

the trend toward broadening the scope of eleventh amendment immunity
66
65
to include prospective relief; and in terms of a "bilateral framework,"

52. Amar, supra note 6, at 1473.
53. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 148-215 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 73-121 and accompanying text.
56. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (held that despite absence of any explicit mention of suits by in-state
plaintiffs, the eleventh amendment nevertheless barred in-state plaintiff from suing Louisiana
against its consent for damages in federal court for alleged violation of the contract clause of
the Constitution).
57. 107 S. Ct. at 2952.
58. Id. But see Nowak, supra note 2, at 1431.
59. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984) ("[a] State's
constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where
it may be sued.") (emphasis in original) ( PennhurstII broadened scope of eleventh amendment
immunity beyond damage suits in holding that the eleventh amendment barred a federal court
from issuing state law based injunctive or prospective relief on behalf of private plaintiffs
against unconsenting state government).
60. See infra notes 122-233 and accompanying text.
61. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
62. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (case which provoked the eleventh amendment). See infra
notes 148-215 and accompanying text. But see Tribe, supra note 6, at 693 ("Nothing in the
language or the history of the eleventh amendment suggests that it must be construed to limit
congressional power under the commerce clause or under any other head of affirmative legislative
authority.").
63. See infra notes 216-33 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 234-6[ and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 263-319 and accompanying text. While Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665,
suggests that private damage suits against states in federal court have been one major focal
point of the eleventh amendment, PennhurstII, 465 U.S. at 106, suggests the Court's willingness
to extend the eleventh amendment to cover purely prospective relief (injunctive relief ordering
state officials to conform future behavior to legal standards).
66. As is extensively argued in this article, the "bilateral framework" is essentially a test
for determining whether federal court jurisdiction over private damage suits against states
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inherent in the recent eleventh amendment cases dealing with specific
congressional grants of federal jurisdiction over state government.67 For

article I enactments, the bilateral framework would essentially protect a
state's right to consent independently, or to withhold consent from, to
federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against it, despite congres-

sional authorization of such jurisdiction.
Part III and Part IV discuss in depth how the more recent eleventh

amendment cases may be read coherently in terms of a bilateral framework
for article I power. Part III argues that the eleventh amendment-commerce

clause cases of Welch (post-Garcia), and Parden and Employees (both preGarcia) support the bilateral framework.68 Part IV argues that Atascadero
has not necessarily foreclosed a state's right to consent independently under
the bilateral framework; 69 and, in affirming Fitzpatrick,70 supports an
effective constitutional distinction between Congress's power under the

71
fourteenth amendment and its power under article I, despite Garcia.

Finally, Part V suggests that justification exists for adopting an express

state consent approach to determine a state's independent consent in bi72
lateral framework analysis.
I.

Union Gas II

AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPREMACY

After finding that the SARA Amendments to the Superfund Act au73
thorized federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states,
Union Gas II turned to the underlying constitutional issue of whether
Congress possessed the power to compel a state government to submit to
such jurisdiction. 4 In answering the question in the affirmative, 71 Union
Gas II adopted the leading academic view of the eleventh amendment held
by Professors Brown, 76 Nowak, 77 and Tribe.7 1 Under that view, the eleventh

constitutionally exists. Simply put, it consists of two elements: (1) clear congressional authorization of federal court jurisdiction over private damage suits against states; and (2) a state's
independent consent to that jurisdiction. See infra notes 366-411 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 320-65 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 366-411 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 413-62 and accompanying text.
70. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43 (affirming and quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at
456).
71. See infra notes 463-508 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 509-26 and accompanying text.
73. 832 F.2d at 1346-50.
74. Id. at 1350-56.
75. Id. at 1356.
76. In his first article, however, Professor Brown criticized the congressional supremacists,
and believed in the possibility of eleventh amendment based affirmative limits on Congress's
power deriving from the eleventh amendment itself. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst, supra note
16, at 392 ("Because the eleventh amendment is a separate and distinct constitutional provision
it may contain (and retain) its own state sovereignty-based limits on congressional power,
whatever the status of the tenth amendment.") (emphasis added). However, in his second article
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amendment is nothing more than a "process" limit requiring Congress to
speak clearly in a statute's face in order to create federal jurisdiction over
private damage suits against state government. Accordingly, when Congress
speaks clearly in the face of a statute, the state's actions are of token
importance, if not altogether irrelevant. In this camp of congressional
supremacy, the eleventh amendment is "process with a bite" 79 or a "presumption of immunity," 80 which the federal judiciary must respect in
exercising general federal question jurisdiction. Nonetheless Congress may
rebut that presumption with a clear, specific grant of jurisdiction providing
for private damage suits against states in federal court, 8' irrespective of
the source of constitutional power used to enact that grant.12 Hence, the
eleventh amendment is fundamentally a dichotomy; it limits the federal
judiciary, but not Congress.
For Union Gas II, the dichotomy of eleventh amendment law essentially
rested on a view similar to McVey,"3 that the history and text of the
eleventh amendment necessarily suggest that it was not intended to limit
affirmatively Congress's power;14 and the conclusion, also supported by
McVey, 85 that Supreme Court precedent had not made a distinction between
the various sources of constitutional power beyond standards for deter7
mining congressional intent.16 Union Gas II, in agreement with McVey,1
also rested the dichotomy of eleventh amendment law on Garcia'sperceived
88
impact on federalism law.

he clearly appears to have moved to the supremacist camp. See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra
note 14, at 365 ("What is left of the eleventh amendment then is a form of process federalism.")
(emphasis added).
77. See Nowak, supra note 2, at 1469. "[The] Congress should be free to determine the
extent of federal court jurisdiction over state governments .... " Id. "[Tlhe Court should take
a limited role in reviewing congressional grants of jurisdiction allowing suits against states."
Id. at 1442. See also M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 165 (1980) (accepts idea of absolute congressional power to create federal
jurisdiction over private damage suits against states, but congressional authorization must be
clear).
78. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 693-99. Cf. Baker, supra note 6, at 184 ("Final power to
balance state and federal interests [in eleventh amendment analysis] ought not to reside in
Congress. But the failure of the structural argument does not discredit the idea that Congress
can normally waive the eleventh amendment so long as it speaks clearly.").
79. Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 365.
80. 832 F.2d at 1354.
81. Id. ("[O]nly Congress' clearly articulated decision to subject the states to suits by private
individuals in federal court operates to rebut this presumption.").
82. Id.
83. See 812 F.2d at 317-19.
84. 832 F.2d at 1353.
85. 812 F.2d at 321.
86. 832 F.2d at 1352-53.
87. 812 F.2d at 320.
88. 832 F.2d at 1354-56.
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assumed that the history of the eleventh

amendment necessarily indicates nothing more than a presumption of immunity. However, current eleventh amendment cases containing the Supreme Court's historical view of the amendment suggest otherwise. 91
Moreover, the amendment's language read in light of its relationship to

article III suggests it was intended to bind both the federal judiciary and
Congress .92
Contrary to the position of Union Gas IP1 and Mc Vey, 94 Hans v. Louisiana95

may be read with the recent cases concerning specific congressional grants
of federal jurisdiction, to require that a state government, through its
independent actions, must consent to the exercise of federal jurisdiction over
96
a private damage suit against it, before federal jurisdiction over it exists.
Union Gas 117 and McVey9 s recognized that Fitzpatrick v. Bitzere 9 held that
Congress may subject state governments to private damage suit in federal
court, regardless of any state consent. However, both Circuits avoided
addressing head on Fitzpatrick's explicit confinement of such power to
section five of the fourteenth amendment," ° and thus its implication that
independent state consent would still be relevant for article I power analysis. 1°1 Excepting section five of the fourteenth amendment, eleventh amendment law may be reconcilable around a state's right to consent independently
to federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against it. Notwithstanding
Union Gas II and McVey, there exists fundamental unity in eleventh amendment doctrine.

89. Id. at 1353. See also Nowak, supra note 2, at 1469 ("the history and purpose of [the
eleventh] amendment establish the principle Congress should be free to determine the extent of
federal court jurisdiction over state governments .... ").
90. 812 F.2d at 318 ("a state is presumptively immune").
91. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 234-50 and accompanying text. But see Tribe, supra note 6, at 693
("Nothing in the language or the history of the eleventh amendment suggests that it must be
construed to limit congressional power under the commerce clause or under any other head of
affirmative legislative authority.") (emphases added).
93. 832 F.2d at 1354.
94. 812 F.2d at 318.
95. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
96. See infra notes 122-40, 321-65 and accompanying text.
97. 832 F.2d at 1351.
98. 812 F.2d at 320.
99. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
100. Id. at 452-53, 455-56.
101. See Union Gas H, 832 F.2d at 1351. See also McVey, 812 F.2d at 323 ("[tlhe fact that,
when Congress acts under the Fourteenth Amendment, it may require the federal courts to
impose monetary damages on a state . . . further convinces us that there is no constitutional
limit on the ability of a federal court to impose money damages on a state.") (citation omitted)).
But see infra notes 463-508 and accompanying text (arguing that effective constitutional distinction between the fourteenth amendment and article I makes sense).
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°3
Union Gas ipo2 and congressional supremacists (Professors Brown,' No-°6
015
°4
thesis'
Wechsler's
Professor
on
extent
wak,' and Tribe' ) rely to some
that the national political process is the sole significant safeguard of state
sovereignty interests. This reliance leads to the view that the state's actions
have no meaningful or independent importance in eleventh amendment
analysis. However, eleventh amendment law has never adopted the Wechsler
thesis, nor even hinted at its adoption. The eleventh amendment's concern
with protecting the states' constitutional right to consent to federal jurisdiction may explain why the post-Garciacases of Atascadero and Welch never
mentioned the Wechsler thesis. Indeed, eleventh amendment law may cast
doubt on the Wechslerian vision of federalism that the national political
process is the sole significant safeguard of state sovereignty. 01 7 The principle
of independent state consent may also suggest that state interests under the
tenth amendment are constitutionally different from state interests under the
eleventh amendment."01 Interestingly, some tendency exists in congressional
supremacy to confuse the eleventh amendment's concern with federal jurisdiction with Congress's ability to create federal causes of action against
states."°9 As a distinct constitutional provision from the tenth amendment,
the eleventh amendment may, however, generate its own limits,1 0 and indeed
its own unity.
Less charitable than Union Gas II is the view that the eleventh amendment
is less than a presumption of immunity, since neither the federal judiciary,
nor Congress, is generally limited by it."' Under this view, the requirement
that Congress clearly authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage suits
against state governments is unnecessary. 2 While Professors Field, Fink,
and Tushnet define the eleventh amendment in terms of a feeble form of
"common law sovereign immunity,""' 3 Justice Brennan" 4 and Professor

102. See 832 F.2d at 1356.
103. See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 393-94.
104. Nowak, supra note 2, at 695.
105. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 695.
106. Wechsler, supra note 40.
107. See Skover, Phoenix Rising, supra note 16, at 303.
108. See generally Jablonski, supra note 42.
109. E.g., Nowak, supra note 2, at 1441 ("A state asserting an eleventh amendment defense
is, in essence, challenging the right of the federal government to impose a monetary burden on
it.").
110. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst, supra note 16, at 392.
111. E.g., Field, Part Two, supra note 6, at 1278 ("I prefer the view that the Eleventh
Amendment was not intended to limit either the Congress or the judiciary.").
112. E.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 253-54 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.) (no need that clear congressional intention be expressed in statute's
face to authorize private damage suits against states in federal court). See also Field, Part One,
supra note 6, at 540-46.
113. See Field, Part Two, supra note 6, at 1280.("The Court should take another look at
the underpinnings of the eleventh amendment and discover the clear evidence that exists in
history that article III and the eleventh amendment leave sovereign immunity in the status of
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Amarl" define the amendment in terms of a specific response to a narrow
technical problem of federal diversity jurisdiction.' 6 In contrast to the scope
of eleventh amendment immunity grudgingly accepted by Union Gas I,117
neither federal question suits,"s nor in-state private suits are properly within

it."' For this camp, the Court's current position on these two problems is
a grave error which demonstrates the incoherence of eleventh amendment
doctrine. 2 0 On the contrary, there may be justification for the Court's current
view. 121
II.
A.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT LAW:

A

UNITY?

Hans v. Louisiana: The Basis of Modern Eleventh Amendment
Doctrine?

Bearing late nineteenth century vintage, the unanimous decision of Hans
v. Louisiana'2 2 lies at the core of modern eleventh amendment doctrine,
defining some of the principal contours of eleventh amendment immunity.
Indeed, certain major aspects of current eleventh amendment doctrine may
be understood as an affirmation, limitation, and expansion of that early
seminal case.
In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sued Louisiana in federal court for damages
arising out of the state's refusal to pay interest due on certain previously
issued bonds. 23 As in Louisiana v. Jumel,124 decided earlier in 1882, a federal
question was involved because the plaintiff argued that the state's refusal to
pay that interest constituted a violation of the self-enforcing contract clause
of the Constitution.'25 Subject matter jurisdiction was therefore argued to

an established common law doctrine.") (emphasis added); Part One, supra note 6, at 540-46.
See also H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 152 (1984).
114. See Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2964-65 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.).
115. See Amar, supra note"6, at 1466-75.
116. See infra notes 197-215 and accompanying text (discussing view that the eleventh
amendment simply removed the state-citizen diversity of article III as independent basis for
federal jurisdiction over out-of-state private damage suits against state government in federal
court).
117. 832 F.2d 1343, 1353-54.
118. Amar, supra note 6, at 1473.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1475-81.
121. See infra notes 141-215 and accompanying text.
122. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
123. Id.
124. 107 U.S. 711 (1882) (held that eleventh amendment barred out-of-state private mandamus
suit in federal court against Louisiana, charging that Louisiana violated the contract clause of
the Constitution when it refused to honor exchange of "old" state bonds for "new" state
bonds to financial detriment of private plaintiffs).
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
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be based on general federal question jurisdiction '2 6 as implemented by the
Judiciary Act of 1875.127 The state raised the eleventh amendment defense
that it had not consented to be sued by private plaintiffs in federal court.' 28
Despite the in-state plaintiff's literal arguments concerning the scope of the
eleventh amendment, 12 9 the Court held, for the first time, that in-state as
well as out-of-state private plaintiffs were within it.13 ° Hans justified this
holding on the basis the eleventh amendment represents, not a "presumption
of immunity" as Union Gas J111 and McVey stated,1 2 but the broad constitutional principle of federalism that unconsenting state governments may
not be sued by private plaintiffs for damages in federal court.' 33
To be sure, Hans involved only a "congressional enactment conferring
general federal question jurisdiction.'" 3 4 However, the unanimous Hans
Court made no distinction between general and specific grants of jurisdiction
to the federal courts. Indeed, it unqualifiedly stated that "[a]ny such power
as that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals
against the [consent of the] States, had been expressly disclaimed, and even
resented, by the great defenders of the Constitution whilst it was on its trial
before the American people."'3 Further, the federalism importance attributed to the eleventh amendment by the Hans Court'16 would suggest that
had there been a congressional grant specifically conferring federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against state government, the same result

126. 134 U.S. at 9.
127. At the time, the Judiciary Act of 1875 invested the federal courts with general federal
question jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
128. 134 U.S. at 3. (state argued that the private plaintiff could not sue it in federal court
"without its permission").
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id. at 15.
131. 832 F.2d at 1354.
132. 812 F.2d at 318.
133. 134 U.S. at 15 ("Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it
was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal
courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly
repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to
it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own
citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States; can we imagine
that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an
absurdity on its face.").
134. Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1354.
135. 134 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added).
136. At the end of its opinion, the Hans Court justified its holding with a federalism theory
concerning the relationship of the federal courts to the state legislatures. 134 U.S. at 21. The
Court felt no need to provide an extensive articulation of this theory, since it had been "fully
discussed by writers on public law." Id. However, the Court stated that "to deprive the [state]
legislature of the power of judging what the honor and safety of the State may require, even
at the expense of a temporary failure to discharge the public debts, would be attended with
greater evils than such failure can cause." Id.
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would have obtained. In Ex parte New York, 3 7 cited with some frequency

in recent years,' 38 the Court affirmed Hans by stating that "it has become
established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power

granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent given

. . .

because

of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification."

9

Thus, it could be argued that the essential jurisdictional deficiency

in Hans was the lack of Louisiana's consent, not the absence of any specific
congressional grant of federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against
states.'40

1. In-state private suits?
Justice Brennan has, however, vigorously criticized the extension of the
amendment's scope to include suits by in-state plaintiffs.' 4' Professor Amar
has recently maintained that this extension demonstrates the clear error of

modern eleventh amendment jurisprudence.'

42 On

the contrary, if the amend-

ment represents a broad, important state sovereignty limitation on the federal
judicial power,' 43 then it would seem unlikely that its framers intended to

permit in-state plaintiffs to sue an unconsenting state government for damages in federal court, while prohibiting out-of-state plaintiffs from doing
that very thing. Professor Brown has recently argued, moreover, that "[the]

narrowness [of the text of the eleventh amendment] need not be a fatal
obstacle to the Hans construction .

. . ."'"

He explains that suits by out-

of-state plaintiffs, and foreign plaintiffs, received the most attention during

the ratification period.' 45 Chisholm v. Georgia,'46 the case that provoked the

eleventh amendment, was in his view, an example of the phenomenon. Since
suits of this kind were most familiar to the framers, we should not be

137. 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
138. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2954 (explaining that in personam admiralty suits against
states in federal court were correctly held to be within scope of the eleventh amendment);
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238-40 n.2.
139. 256 U.S. at 497 (emphasis added).
140. Lack of state consent may also be one important aspect of Justice Iredell's dissent in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793). See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying
text.
141. See Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2958, 2962, 2969-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Amar, supra note 6, at 1476.
143. See Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 292 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result)
("despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment, its spirit has consistently guided
this Court in interpreting the reach of the federal judicial power generally ....") (emphasis
added); ("[the eleventh amendment] limitation upon the judicial power is, without question, a
reflection of concern for the sovereignty of the States ..
) Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
144. Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 374.
145. Id.
146. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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surprised that the eleventh amendment explicitly identifies only these suits.
As Professor Field has argued, furthermore, the amendment's framers also
may have failed to include in-state citizen suits, or even purposefully omitted
147
them, because at the time they may not have existed.
2. Chisholm v. Georgia, the eleventh amendment and federal question
private suits?
The eleventh amendment passed both houses of Congress by large majorities, and within two years of the Chisholm holding was ratified by the
necessary 12 states on February 7, 1795.14 The Court has recently maintained,
and perhaps not unjustifiably, that "the speed and vigor of the Nation's
response to Chisholm suggests that the Eleventh Amendment should be
construed broadly so as to further the federal interests that the court misapprehended in Chisholm.' 14 9 Professor Jacobs has noted that Chisholm
raised an alarm because the seriatim opinions of the majority Justices "all
but denied the sovereignty of the states."' 50 After Chisholm, the states became
deeply suspicious of the federal courts as institutions of the national government which threatened their financial integrity, and their continued existence as separate sovereigns in the federal system. 5' Thus, the principle
that "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which
limit and control"' 5 2 would seem particularly applicable to interpreting the
eleventh amendment. As Justice Powell has emphasized: "principles of
federalism ...underlie the Eleventh Amendment."' 53
-While the history behind the eleventh amendment is unclear and controversial, 154 the Court's view of that history has become clarified over time.
Essentially, the Court has adhered to the view expressed in Hans that the
eleventh amendment was adopted not only to overturn the famous case of

147. Field, Part One, supra note 6, at 540 n.88. If in-state suits were not within the
amendment's scope, how would this affect the argument that the amendment limits Congress's
power to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts over compulsory out-of-state private damage
suits against states? It is possible that the argument for an eleventh amendment limitation on
Congress's power would remain unaffected.
148. B. KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 407, Vol. v (1987).
149. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2952 n.17.
150. C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 71 (1972).
151. Id. States were also fearful of suits related to the confiscation of Loyalist property. Id.
at 57-62, 178 n.72. The states were fearful of debilitating suits seeking satisfaction of Revolutionary War debts. See Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 HOUSTON L.
REV. 1, 7, 9 (1967).

152. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
153. Pennhurst I, 465 U.S. at 106.
154. See generally Lee, Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of
History, 18 URB. LAW. 519 (1986). See also C. JACOBS supra note 150; J. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 74-75 (1987); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Nowak, supra note
2, at 1423-41. The Court has acknowledged the ambiguity of the amendment's history. Welch,
107 S. Ct. at 2951.
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Chisholm v. Georgia, but to restore the "original understanding" of the
scope of article III regarding federal jurisdiction over compulsory private
suits against states."' As Justices Marshall and Stewart explained, "[i]t had
been widely understood prior to ratification of the Constitution that the
provision in Article III, section 2, concerning 'Controversies . . . between a
State and Citizens of another State' would not provide a mechanism for
making States unwilling defendants in federal court." 156 Relying on historian
Charles Warren, 5 7 the Court has maintained that the "original understanding" may have been necessary to ratification of the Constitution."' While
scholars and members of the Court all agree that the eleventh amendment
was adopted in reaction to the famous case of Chisholm, they vehemently
disagree, however, over the nature and scope of the immunity arising out
of the reaction to Chisholm, culminating in the eleventh amendment. Apart
from the controversy over in-state plaintiffs, a debate rages over whether
the amendment properly extends to federal question suits.5 9 Since Congress
has the sole responsibility for enacting federal law, the federal question suit
issue bears fundamental importance to whether the amendment affirmatively
limits the Congress in any way. Thus it is important to understand Chisholm,
and the broader federalism concerns raised by its facts and the various
seriatim opinions of the majority and dissenting Justices.
In 1792, a private plaintiff, the executor of a South Carolina merchant,
sued Georgia in federal court' 6° for breach of a war supplies contract, seeking
damages from the state treasury.' 6' Declining to argue the case orally in the
federal forum, 6 2 the state maintained that the state-citizen diversity clause
of article III, section 2, on which jurisdiction was argued to be constitutionally based, must be read narrowly to permit states to prosecute out-ofstate defendants in a federal forum, but not vice-versa. 63 Article III, in the
state's view, did not authorize private suits against unwilling state defendants
in federal court, and thus section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 could not,

155. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2949 (quoting Employees, 411 U.S. at 292 (Marshall & Stewart,
JJ., concurring in result)).
156. Employees, 411 U.S. at 291-92 (emphasis added).
157. C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1923).

158. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2951; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 660.
159. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 286-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.).
160. The case was originally brought before the Supreme Court. Under the Judiciary Act of
1789, the Supreme Court had been granted original but not exclusive jurisdiction of civil
controversies "between a state and citizens of other states"-the clause which raised the
constitutional issue of whether article III authorized private plaintiffs to sue unconsenting states
in federal court. In today's context, the eleventh amendment regulates the original jurisdiction
of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, but clearly not the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.
161. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419-20.
162. Id. at 469. See also C. JACOBS, supra note 150, at 48.
163. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 473, 476 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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whatever it stated or implied.' 64 Rejecting the state's jurisdictional defense,
the Court held that state defendants could be constitutionally compelled
against their will into federal court to defend a private suit seeking damages
1 65
from the state treasury.
In reaching this conclusion, the seriatim opinions of the Justices in the
majority generally maintained that the states enjoyed a very limited sovereignty under the new Constitution, and thus were not sovereign in the same
sense as were European governments.166 In their view, the limitations on
state sovereignty in the Constitution meant that states must be suable in
federal court by private plaintiffs seeking damages. 67 Otherwise they suggested, those limitations could not be enforced. 168 The majority Justices
maintained, moreover, that ample evidence existed that the Constitution
approved of federal jurisdiction over unconsenting state defendants. As an
example, three Justices in the Chisholm majority pointed to article III's
conferral of jurisdiction to the federal courts to decide controversies between
two or more states. 69 Since states must be able to sue other states in federal
court, these Justices reasoned (in logic now ostensibly rejected by the current
Court)7 0 that private plaintiffs must also be able to sue unconsenting state
defendants in federal court. At least two of the Justices in the Chisholm
majority also suggested, however, that effective vindication of individual
rights against states would require private damage suits against unconsenting
states in federal court under article III's general federal question jurisdiction.' 7' The Chisholm Court thus felt compelled to reject the "original
understanding" that the states retained any constitutional immunity from
compulsory private damage suit in federal court under article III, despite
72
the absence of any federal question in the suit.
Assuming that the state-citizen diversity clause of article III, section 2
conferred jurisdiction, the majority Justices recognized the existence of a
general federal corporate law of state assumpsit liability, 17 despite the absence of any such liability in any state's common law or federal law at the
time. Committing what would appear similar to an Erie error, and antici-

164. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 stated as follows: "[Tihe Supreme Court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except
between a state and its own citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction."
165. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 476 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
166. E.g., id. at 472, 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
167. E.g., id. at 467-68 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
168. Id. at 468.
169. Id. at 450-51, 465 (opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 466-67 (opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at
472, 473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
170. See Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2953.
171. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 468 (opinion of Cushing, J.). See
also id. at 421-22 (oral argument of Randolph).
172. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1469.
173. E.g., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 464 (opinion of Blair, J.).
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pating Swift v. Tyson 74 in some sense, the Court created principles of federal
common law,' without any authorization for doing so, except "general
principles of right and equality."' 7 6 On this federal common law basis, it
predicated Georgia's liability to the out-of-state private plaintiff. In reaching
this conclusion, the majority Justices analogized a state to a corporation,
insofar as each were equally capable of entering into, and equally responsible
77
for breaches of, contractual obligation.'
Justice Iredell in dissent, however, rejected the view that any federal
common law of state assumpsit liability existed. 7 ' Consistent with current
eleventh amendment jurisprudence, 7 9 he expressed the view that states were
special actors in the federal system, whose vital role and fundamental
importance in that system contradicted Chisholm's implication that states
became merely corporations after ratifying the Constitution. 80 The importance of Justice Iredell's dissent, however, goes beyond his rejection of the
majority's Erie-like error. There is justification for the Hans Court's view
that Justice Iredell's dissent significantly influenced the framers of the eleventh amendment.' 8 ' Indeed, Justice Iredell's dissent suggests that the Chisholm majority faltered on constitutional shores much more fundamental than
Erie.
While Justice Iredell discussed the state-citizen diversity clause of article
III, and section 13 of the Judiciary Act,'82 it is by no means clear that his
jurisdictional analysis can be limited to the narrow question of whether the
parties' statuses conferred federal jurisdiction.'83 His analysis seems to be
focussed, rather, on a larger question of whether there was a "subject
matter"' 8 4 basis for federal jurisdiction over a compulsory private damage
suit against a state government; or a more fundamental jurisdictional predicate than simply the state-citizen diversity clause. He noted that both article
III and the Judiciary Act limited federal jurisdiction to "controversies,"
though the Judiciary Act qualified controversies with the word "civil."' 8 5
The judicial power of the United States only could be exercised, from his
8 6
standpoint, over "such controversies in which a state can be a party.'

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
Amar, supra note 6, at 1470-1472.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 456 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
Id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
Id. at 448 (Iredell, J., dissenting).

179.
180.
181.
182.

E.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 448.
134 U.S. at 12, 14, 18-19.
2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 430.

183. One question raised by Professor Amar's analysis is whether Justice Iredell's analysis
is so neatly separatable into the "substantive" and the "jurisdictional." See Amar, supra note
6, at 1472.
184. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 430-31, 435.
185. Id.at 431.
186. Id.at 435 (emphasis in original).
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Since neither the Constitution, nor the Act, provided any guidance as to the
81 7
meaning of "controversies," he looked to the common law for assistance.
"[Als the law stands at present, [a private contract action against the consent
of a state] . . . is not maintainable" he argued, "whatever opinion may be
entertained, upon the construction of the constitution as to the power of

Congress to authorize such a one."'"" "[Elven if the constitution would
admit of the exercise of such a power [to invest the federal courts with
power to hear a compulsory private damage suit against a state]," he
maintained, "a new law is necessary for the purpose, since no part of the
existing law applies, this alone is sufficient to justify my determination in
the present case." 8 9 Toward the end of his dissent, Justice Iredell, consistent
with the above statement, stated that there was no "new law" or "old law"
that "in any manner authorize[d] the present suit, either by precedent or
analogy."' 9 Since no subject matter basis for federal jurisdiction existed,
the compulsory private damage suit against the state, from his standpoint,
therefore had to be dismissed, despite the state-citizen diversity clause of
article III and the Judiciary Act which attempted to implement it.
However, Justice Iredell's dissent could be understood as a broader statement of the reach of the federal judicial power under the Constitution, and
as a reaction to the majority's sweeping rejection of any notion of a state's
constitutional immunity from private damage suit in federal court.' 9' While
concurring with the majority that the Constitution imposed certain limitations
on the states, 92 he indicated in unambiguous language that he was "strongly
against any construction of [the Constitution], which will admit, under any
circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money."' 93
Thus, a compulsory private damage suit in federal court would not have
been a "controversy," and would not have been necessary, in his view, to
vindicate federal rights, congressionally-created or constitutional. 194 The more
fundamental jurisdictional predicate for which Justice Iredell was searching
would thus seem to have been a state's independent consent. In this respect,

187. Id. at 434.
188. Id. at 436.
189. Id. at 449.
190. Id. at 448.
191. See Nowak, supra note 2, at 1432 ("There is language in the Iredell opinion which
indicates that he believed that Congress was without authority to add [compulsory private
damage suits against states] to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.") (emphasis added).
192. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
194. But see Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2966 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I think it plain that
Justice Iredell's conception of state sovereign immunity supports the notion that States should
not be immune from suit in federal court in federal question or admiralty cases.") Professor
Amar has acknowledged that "[Justice] Iredell did write that he was inclined to believe that
full vindication of congressionally-created and constitutional rights would never require 'a
compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money."' Amar, supra note 6, at 1473
(quoting 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 499). However, he takes the spin off this by characterizing Justice
Iredell's view as "pure dicta." Id.
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Justice Iredell's analysis would be congruent with the current Court's "original understanding" view of article III and the eleventh amendment: that
states could not be sued against their consent by private plaintiffs in federal
court. Had he been forced to address the question of whether a state could
be compelled to defend a private damage action in federal court based on
federal law, or whether a federal question would have conferred "subject
matter" jurisdiction in the federal courts for such a suit, Justice Iredell
would have answered the question in the negative. 95 While Justice Iredell
indicated that the case before him did not contain either congressionallycreated or constitutional rights, 96 the emphasis and clarity with which he
stated his views on the matter cannot be ignored.
Professor Amar has recently argued, however, that in Chisholm both the
majority Justices and Justice Iredell concurred that jurisdiction in the federal
court was solely predicated on the state-citizen diversity clause of article III,
section 2-"between a State and Citizens of another State."' 97 The eleventh
amendment, as a reaction to Chisholm, he thus argues, must have simply
removed the state-citizen diversity clause in article III, section 2 as an
independent jurisdictional basis for private suits against states in federal
court. 98 Professor Amar also has limited the "defect of Chisholm [to] its
displacement of the prevailing state common law of government immunity
with a 'general' common law of state assumpsit liability in a case presenting
no question of substantive federal law. "199 The eleventh amendment, in his
view, thus was never intended to disturb general federal question jurisdiction
as a basis for federal jurisdiction over compulsory private suits against
states. 2 00 As he phrases it, the eleventh amendment was not "designed as a
barrier cutting across ' 20' the general federal question jurisdiction provisions
in article III.
However, contrary to Professor Amar's argument, Justice Iredell was
arguably concerned not only with party status, but with more general questions of federal court jurisdiction over state government. At the beginning
of his dissent, Justice Iredell indicated that "every thing [he had] to say
upon [the question of whether a state could be sued in assumpsit] will effect
every kind of suit, the object of which is to compel the payment of money
°
202
by a state.

195. In this author's view, Justice Iredell's "substantive" analysis would have merged with
his "jurisdictional" analysis to prevent federal jurisdiction. But see Amar, supra note 6, at
1472.
196. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449-50.
197. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1470 "Jurisdiction rested exclusively on diverse party status
[for the majority Justices]"; and "[Justice] Iredell carefully limited his discussion to pure diverse
party cases against states .... " Id. at 1472.
198. Id. at 1474.
199. Id. (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at 1474-75.
201. Id. at 1475.
202. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 430.
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In his neo-Federalist interpretation, Professor Amar limits the eleventh
amendment to the narrow facts in Chisholm, despite the majority Justices'
sweeping rejection of any state immunity from suit in federal court, and
Justice Iredell's articulated concerns about the federalism implication of that
rejection. 2 3 While the narrow facts of Chisholm involved no substantive
federal law, both the majority Justices 204 and the dissenting Justice 2 5 felt the
need to comment on the question of general federal question jurisdiction in
the context of a compulsory private damage suit against a state in federal
court.
206
Moreover, the text of the amendment-"any suit in law or equity" 20 7
may directly belie the neo-Federalist view. Broad enough to include federal
question cases, the amendment's text directly suggests that the framers
intended to rebut any suggestion by the majority Justices in Chisholm that
a federal question would confer jurisdiction in a federal court over a compulsory private damage suit against a state. 20 8 Although Chisholm involved
no federal question, Professor Jacobs suggests, moreover, that the eleventh
amendment should be viewed as a response to three other cases before the
Supreme Court which involved federal questions under the Constitution or
United States treaties. 209 The breadth of the amendment's text suggests that
the framers may have had these cases in mind when drafting the eleventh
amendment. Rather than giving the words "any suit in law or equity" their
natural import, the neo-Federalist restricts the meaning of "any" to exclude
from the amendment's scope those suits having a jurisdictional basis other
than, or in addition to, the diversity of citizenship between private plaintiff
and defendant state. The framers may have thought the breadth inherent 2in
10
the words "shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity"
sufficient to countermand any inclination by contemporaries to use the
words-"all Cases, in Law and Equity" of article III as an argument that
a federal question would constitute a jurisdictional basis for a compulsory
private damage suit against a state in federal court.
Furthermore, as framers of an amendment to the Constitution, the framers
of the eleventh amendment clearly would not have been bound to limit the

203. Id. at 448.

204. Professor Amar recognizes that the majority justices felt the need to comment on the
article III grant of federal question jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1469.
205. Professor Amar also recognizes that Justice Iredell commented on article III's grant of
general federal question jurisdiction. Amar, supra note 6, at 1473.
206. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI (emphasis added).
207. See Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2952. In Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933), the Court
indicated that the words "in law or equity" in the eleventh amendment's text were meant to
cover suits based on federal questions as well as state law. Id. at 26-27.
208. E.g., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 468 (opinion of Cushing,

J.).
209. Professor Jacobs indicates that they were Moultrie v. Georgia and Vassal v. Massachusetts, both unreported and dismissed, and Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320 (1796). C.
JACOBS, supra note 150, at 94.
210. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI (emphasis added).
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scope of eleventh amendment immunity to the facts of the Chisholm case.
Thus, they could have adopted Justice Iredell's view of compulsory private
damage suits against states in federal court as Hans suggested,21 even if it
were "pure dicta. 212 Since the framers were apparently quite concerned with
protecting state treasuries from private debt suits, it is indeed difficult to
believe that they would have made a distinction between federal question
damage suits and state law damage suits against state government. Damage
suits, irrespective of their basis in federal or state law, impact on state
treasuries. Professor Tribe has well noted that "[tihe Georgia House of
Representatives was so exercised by the [Chisholm] decision that it made
any attempt to carry out the Supreme Court's mandate a felony punishable
by hanging without the benefit of clergy." 2"3 Finally, "the delicate problems
of enforcing judgments against the States, .

.

. raised by both Federalists

and Anti-Federalists ....,,14 apply without preference to federal question
cases. Enforcement of damage judgments against states by federal courts
requires their intrusion into state fiscal policy, irrespective of the federal or
215
state law basis of the suit.
3.

The constitutionalstatus of eleventh amendment immunity?

Apart from its scope, the constitutional status of eleventh amendment
immunity spawns great controversy among both scholars and Supreme Court
justices. 21 6 Professor Field has argued that Hans can be read consistently
with the view that the eleventh amendment is merely common law sovereign
immunity.21 7 If that were true, however, then it would seem that the combination of the grant of general federal question jurisdiction and a selfenforcing constitutional provision 2 s would have been sufficient for the Hans
Court to allow the federal court to assert jurisdiction over a private damage
suit against Louisiana, regardless of its consent; the Constitution is clearly
superior to any principle of common law. Yet, the Hans Court held that
the eleventh amendment barred federal court jurisdiction over such a suit
against Louisiana. Thus, an immunity principle of constitutional status was
necessary for the Hans Court to limit federal jurisdiction over the state in

211. 134 U.S. at 12, 14, 18-19.
212. Amar, supra note 6, at 1473 (describing portion of Justice Iredell's opinion as "pure
dicta").
213. Tribe, supra note 6, at 683 (footnote omitted).
214. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2950.

215. See Jumel, 107 U.S. at 727-28.
216. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2962-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.);
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 268, 276-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined

by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.).
217. Field, Part One, supra note 6, at 537.
218. Justices Marshall and Stewart explained that "the Contract Clause is self-enforcing

. .

it requires no congressional act to make its guarantee enforceable in a judicial suit." Employees,
411 U.S. at 292-93 n.8 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
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a compulsory private damage suit based on a self-enforcing provision of the
Constitution.
Moreover, the Hans Court understood the states' immunity from compulsory private damage suit in federal court to be an important form of
protection for states from federal power, with secure constitutional mooring
in the eleventh amendment. 21 9 Indeed, the Hans Court indicated that the
eleventh amendment was "superior to all legislatures and all courts .... ,220
The question of whether, and why, the states would have protected themselves
from the federal government with an amendment subject to override by the
federal government, must have crossed the minds of the members of the
unanimous Hans Court.
For the Hans Court and the Jumel Court, important policy concerns
underpinned the constitutional status of eleventh amendment immunity. The
danger of substituting rule by the state legislature with rule by the federal
court was one basis of their concerns. 221 If the eleventh amendment represents
a "broad, ' 222 "stable," 223 constitutional principle of state immunity from
unconsented federal jurisdiction over private suits rooted in these policy
concerns, not only a federal court, but even Congress's clear will should
have to respect such a principle. Indeed, in the most recent case of Welch,
the Court stated that "[tihe Court's unanimous decision in Hans v. Louisiana
... firmly established that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a broad
constitutional principle of sovereign immunity. ' 224 Before his views changed,
Justice Marshall had indicated, along with Justice Potter Stewart, that there
was "little basis for doubting that Hans rested upon considerations as to
constitutional limitations on the reach of federal judicial power, a view
confirmed by the decision's lengthy analysis of the constitutional debates
surrounding Art. III .. .. 225
There can be no doubt but that the eleventh amendment was ratified in
1795, and officially announced as part of the Constitution in 1798; and
indeed properly added to the Constitution through the amendment process
pursuant to article V.226 In providing the amendment process in article V,

219. 134 U.S. at 12. McVey reasoned that Hans did not rest on the eleventh amendment,
but on state sovereignty. 812 F.2d at 318. However, this position would seem only to confuse
matters, since the eleventh amendment is a principle of state sovereignty. "This [eleventh
amendment] limitation upon the judicial power is, without question, a reflection of concern
Employees, 411 U.S. at 293 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ.,
for the sovereignty of the States .
concurring in result).
220. See Hans, 134 U.S. at I1 (emphasis added).
221. See id. at 21; Jumel, 107 U.S. at 722.
222. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2952.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2952.
225. Employees, 411 U.S. at 293 n.8 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result) (emphasis

added).
226. For a concise history of the eleventh amendment see B.
FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 407, vol. v. (1987).

KURLAND
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we must not forget that the Framers intended to enable the people of the
United States, after the Constitution's ratification, to put beyond the reach
of temporary majorities in the federal legislature certain principles of fundamental law. Thus, there must be some "core ' 227 of eleventh amendment
protection impregnable to attack from both Congress and the federal judiciary.
Union Gas II to the contrary notwithstanding, 221 the "clear statement
rule ' 229 could not be the constitutional "core" of the eleventh amendment,
since such a rule merely dictates how clearly Congress must speak to the
states in statutes affecting them; such a rule could not thus effectively limit
federal court jurisdiction over compulsory private damage suits against states.:
precisely one problem the amendment was adopted to address. Such a rule
might operate as a limitation in the short term, but once Congress learns
how to speak with "clear statement," the eleventh amendment could be
eroded from the Constitution. Moreover, the Garciadissenters' position that
Congress has been made structurally insensitive to the needs and interests
of state government 230 only buttresses the view that the eleventh amendment
should be viewed as something more than the clear statement rule. If
Congress has been made to some extent structurally insensitive to state
interests, as the Garcia dissenters generally maintained, then the assumption
that Congress must have considered the interests of the states simply because
spoke clearly to them would indeed be questionable. In assessing whether
the "clear statement rule" is the constitutional core of the eleventh amendment, one should also bear in mind that Congress's structural insensitivity
to state interests is only compounded by the fact that the states are neither
23
directly nor indirectly represented in the federal courts. '
Furthermore, in the congressional supremacist's argument, an uncomfortable fundamental tension certainly exists between the objectives of article
V's amendment process, and the inherent nature of a presumption always
subject to Congress's will. Because that argument assumes a major departure
from article V's goals, this argument carries a heavy burden indeed. Perhaps
it is a burden which the ambiguous historical support available is inherently
23 2
unable to bear.
In the absence of clear contrary evidence, an amendment to the Constitution must be presumed to bear principles of constitutional status binding

227. Tribe, supra note 6, at 687 (describing core as consisting of protection for states from
private damage suits in federal court).
228. 832 F.2d at 1354 ("The presumption of immunity and the high threshold for its rebuttal
animate the notion of sovereignty that underlies the eleventh amendment."). Professor Tribe
argues that the clear statement rule is the sum and substance of the eleventh amendment
immunity of the states. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 695.
229. Tribe, supra note 6, at 695.
230. 469 U.S. at 564-67, 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist
& O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Powell & Rehnquist, JJ.).
231. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304. 317 n.9 (1981).
232. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2950-51.
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on the federal legislature and the federal judiciary. This would be even truer
for an amendment intended to restrict the reach of article III judicial power,
which is generally not self-executing. Interestingly, the view that the eleventh
amendment is merely a presumption of immunity, or common law sovereign
immunity, may derive as much from a particular view of the amendment's
history as from an analysis of eleventh amendment doctrine, which might
support the possibility of an affirmative limit on Congress's power to create
federal jurisdiction over state government, were it not for the "confusing,
convoluted, and essentially disingenuous reasoning . . . [of eleventh amend-

ment law] .'233
B. Article Il, the Eleventh Amendment, and CongressionalPower
If "the Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of the
framers [of the Constitution] concerning the reach of federal judicial power,' '234
even specific congressional grants of jurisdiction, in the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary, would be included in the scope of the eleventh
amendment, since article III was generally understood not to be self-executing. Moreover, the functional and close linguistic parallel between article III
and the eleventh amendment also may provide for the application of the
eleventh amendment's limiting force to congressional grants of federal jurisdiction over state government.
As does article III in some circumstances, the eleventh amendment essentially operates to prevent federal jurisdiction. 235 The eleventh amendment,
however, does not constitute an absolute bar to federal jurisdiction, unlike
article 111.236 Rather, it constitutionally prohibits federal jurisdiction over
private damage suits237 against a state government 23 which has not consented

233. Field, Part Two, supra note 6, at 1279.
234. 411 U.S. at 291 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
235. Cf. Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900).

236. Under article III principles of jurisdiction, parties may not mutually consent to create
federal jurisdiction where their controversy does not meet article III requirements, i.e., "diversity
of citizenship" or "case or controversy." However, under eleventh amendment principles of
jurisdiction, the parties' consent may create federal jurisdiction.
237. For reasons intrinsic to the "constitutional plan," and in the interest of the permanency
within the union, the United States may sue an unconsenting state in federal court. United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329
(1934). In the interest of peace between states, a state may sue an unconsenting sister state in
federal court. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 328. See also North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365,
372-73 (1923); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315-21 (1904). Cf. New Hampshire
v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) (state may not bring suit against unconsenting state in
federal court to vindicate rights of a group of citizens for purpose of circumventing the eleventh
amendment). While the structure of the federal union implies that the federal interest in a
federal forum outweighs any state interest in freedom from federal jurisdiction for suits brought
by the United States or other states, eleventh amendment law suggests that, for different
structural reasons relating to the vitality and integrity of state government, this balance tilts in
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to that federal jurisdiction. By consenting to federal jurisdiction, the state
government waives its eleventh amendment immunity, and removes what
otherwise would be a constitutional bar to federal jurisdiction.2 3 9 Without
reference to the tenth amendment, Justice Powell has succinctly described
the eleventh amendment's focus on unconsented-to federal court jurisdiction
' ' 24
as the "constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States. 0
The Court has attributed "Article III status" to the eleventh amendment
insofar as it has maintained that the amendment directly circumscribes the
grant of judicial power in article III, despite the fact that the eleventh
amendment is not an absolute bar to federal jurisdiction. 2 4 1 Striking linguistic
similarity between the eleventh amendment and article III may justify this
attribution. One should compare the following language: "The judicial Power
of the United States, shall be .. ,,2 with "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be .... ' ';243 and "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law or Equity .... ,,244with "The Judicial power . . .shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity ....-241
Justice Powell

the states' favor for compulsory private suits. This theory arguably lies implicit in Welch, 107
S. Ct. at 2953.
238. The eleventh amendment has been held to apply to state agencies, but not to political
subdivisions of the state. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). See also Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (counties
do not enjoy eleventh amendment protection); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (school boards do not enjoy eleventh amendment protection).
However, in Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. at 123 n.34, Justice Powell stated the following: "At the
same time [referring to the cases of Mt. Healthy and Luning], we have applied the [eleventh]
Amendment to bar relief against county officials 'in order to protect the state treasury from
liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgement against
the State itself' (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. 440 U.S. at 401). See also Comment, The
Denialof Eleventh Amendment Immunity to PoliticalSubdivisions of the States: An Unjustified

Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1042, 1042-49 (refusal to apply eleventh amendment
immunity to political subdivisions is an exception). The same structural reasons relating to the
vitality and integrity of state government would seem to apply with equal force to municipal,
county and town governments, but the Court has so far refused to extend eleventh amendment
protection to them.
239. Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2945 ("[i]f a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in
federal court, the suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). Accord Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 238; Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. at 99 (1984); Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673-74; Employees, 411 U.S. at
280 n.2; Parden, 377 U.S. at 192; Hans, 134 U.S. at 13-17; Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436
(1883).

240. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240 (quoting PennhurstII,
465 U.S. at 98 and Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)). See also Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2952 ("the Eleventh Amendment

embodies a broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity"); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at
242 ("the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court"); Pennhurst II,
465 U.S. at 112 ("constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity").
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Pennhurst I, 465 U.S. at 98.
U.S. CONST. art. III,
sec. 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
U.S. CONST. art. III,
sec. 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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has stated that "[i]n language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh
Amendment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Art. III, suits
'commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States.' "246
It is well settled constitutional law that Congress may not expand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the confines of article 111.247 As
yet, the Court has not been forced to determine definitively whether the
eleventh amendment affirmatively limits Congress's power to expand federal
jurisdiction over state government in an exercise of the article I commerce
clause power. However, the clear implication of the recent attribution of
"Article III status" to the eleventh amendment is that just as article III
limits Congress's constitutional power to expand federal court jurisdiction
affirmatively, so would the eleventh amendment. Indeed, the Court has
stated that "the history of the adoption and development of the [eleventh]
Amendment ... confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises
of Art. III power: 'the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution
does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties
against a State without consent given.' "248 If "[t]he root of the constitutional
impediment to the exercise of the federal judicial power is ...Art. III of
our Constitution,9 249 the eleventh amendment thus could be viewed as a
general limit on congressional power to create federal jurisdiction over private
250
damage suits against unconsenting state governments.
In analyzing the relationship between article III and the eleventh amendment, the McVey court found in the words "the Judicial power shall not be
construed to extend ' 2 ' clear evidence that the amendment was intended to
apply to only the federal courts, and not Congress. 25 2 However, the McVey
court, and Union Gas II in reliance, 253 failed to recognize that since Marbury
v. Madison25 4 a limitation on the judicial power established in article III
must be a limitation on Congress's power to execute that judicial power in
conferring jurisdiction to the federal courts. 255 Since the eleventh amendment
is, as the Court maintains, a limitation on the judicial power established in

246. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 525 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
247. The grant of judicial power in article III may not be expanded by legislation. Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 60 (1803). In Muskrat v United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911),
the Court held that Congress may not vest the federal courts with authority to render advisory
opinions in derogation of the case or controversy requirement. Nor may it be expanded by
consent of the parties. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Mansfield, C. &
L.M. Ry. v. Swan, III U.S. 379 (1884).
248. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 120 (quoting Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. at 497) (emphasis
added). See also Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (quoting Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 98). But see
Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2969-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249. Employees, 411 U.S. at 291 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
250. But see Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1353.
251. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
252. 812 F.2d at 318.
253. 832 F.2d at 1353.
254. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
255. See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 369.
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article III, it follows that the amendment also must limit Congress's power
to confer jurisdiction to the federal courts.
Based on comparisons between article III principles of jurisdiction and
eleventh amendment principles, commentators have implied, however, that
the eleventh amendment should have no affirmative limiting effect on con256
gressional power to expand federal jurisdiction over state government.
Since the eleventh amendment is distinctly unlike article III inasmuch as
mutual consent may create federal jurisdiction, eleventh amendment law,
2
commentary suggests, ought to be disqualified from binding Congress. "1
However, the wrong question may have been asked. The proper question
might be not whether there are divergences between article III and eleventh
amendment principles of jurisdiction; but, rather, whether these divergences
from the traditional article III model necessarily preclude the eleventh amendment from being construed as a limit, binding on both Congress and federal
courts alike, as is article III.
Professor Redish has maintained that "[alside from pointing to this one
difference, 258 commentators have failed to justify so drastic a distinction in
construction between the limits on the judicial power imposed by Article III
and those imposed by the eleventh amendment.

'25 9

In this author's view,

this difference between article III and the eleventh amendment does not
necessarily lead to distinctions between congressional and judicial power.
Indeed, as Professor Redish has stated, the framers of the eleventh amendment generally were concerned with subjecting states that had not consented
to suits for damages in federal court. 216 In the circumstances where a state
has not consented, a principal concern of the eleventh amendment would be
salient, justifying a limitation not only on the federal courts, but on Congress
as well. If this may be considered anomalous, it "is an anomaly that is well
'26
established as a part of our constitutional jurisprudence.
C. The Eleventh Amendment: "An Admittedly Arbitrary
Distinction" 262Between Permissible and Impermissible Relief?
Edelman v. Jordan,263 based on its analysis of Ex parte Young, 264 limited
the scope of eleventh amendment immunity to private suits seeking "retro-

256. See id. at 368. See also Baker, supra note 6, at 150.
257. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 2, at 1442 ("the Court ... should not interpret [the
eleventh amendment] as a limitation on congressional power").
258. Professor Redish is referring to the fact that under eleventh amendment principles a
state may consent to federal jurisdiction as opposed to article IIl principles where parties may
not create jurisdiction through consent.
259. M. REDISH, supra note 77, at 152 n.94.
260. Id.
261. Employees, 411 U.S. at 294 n.10 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
262. McVey, 812 F.2d at 322.
263. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
264. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-71 (discussing Young).
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active relief ' 26' (essentially compensatory damages from the state treasury).2 66
Edelman distinguished between federal court "prospective relief ' 2 67 (essentially injunctive relief requiring state officials to conform future conduct to
legal standards) 2 68 and retroactive relief. Notwithstanding the amendment's
text: "any suit in .. . equity," 269 Edelman suggested that a federal court
must be able to issue federal law prospective relief against state government
in order to vindicate the supremacy of federal law.2 70 It recognized, however,

that certain forms of prospective relief would be more onerous to state
27
government than retroactive relief. '
Sensing a doctrinal weakness, McVey argued that eleventh amendment law
had "imposed an admittedly arbitrary distinction ' 272 between permissible
and impermissible private suits against states in federal court. It thus maintained that the amendment ought not to be viewed as a constitutional
limitation on the article III powers of the federal courts.2 73 A fortiori, it
reasoned that the eleventh amendment could not be an affirmative limitation
on Congress's power to invest the federal courts with jurisdiction over state
government.2 74 Neither McVey, nor Union Gas II recognized, however, that
recent eleventh amendment developments already may have weakened Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief as a doctrinal
barrier to further expansion of eleventh amendment protection for states.
In Young,271private plaintiffs suing state officials in federal court sought
to enjoin the enforcement of state statute allegedly violating the fourteenth
amendment. The Young Court permitted a federal court to enjoin Minnesota's Attorney General from enforcing the state statute at issue, regardless
of any state or state officials' consent to federal jurisdiction. 276 In so holding,
it adopted the fictional theory that such a suit is not one "against the state,"
but rather against the state officials who, by allegedly violating the Constitution, are no longer representatives of the state. 277 It maintained that the
federal court's issuance of an injunction based on the fourteenth amendment
ordering state officials to refrain from the challenged conduct would not

265. 415 U.S. at 664 ("the award of an accrued monetary liability which
the general revenues of a State").
266. Id. at 663-68 (1974).
267. Edelman defined one form of prospective relief as an injunction
future conduct of [a state official or state officials] to the requirement
Amendment." 415 U.S. at 664.
268. Id. at 664-68.
269. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
270. 415 U.S. at 668. See also Pennhurst II,465 U.S. at 105 (explaining
271. Id.at 667.
272. 812 F.2d at 322.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 159-60.

must be met from

"to conform ...
of the Fourteenth

Edelman).
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violate the eleventh amendment, 27 regardless of either the state's consent,
or its officials' consent. While the Young Court distinguished equitable relief
from legal relief,2 79 its "fictional theory" left many questions unanswered
as to the nature and range of prospective relief a federal court could issue
against an unconsenting state government.
Edelman narrowed Young insofar as it held that any equitable or legal
relief issued by a federal court which requires direct payment from the state

treasury against an unconsenting state government violates the eleventh
amendment. 2 0 At the same time, however, Edelman maintained a rather

rigid distinction between prospective relief and retroactive relief, despite
recognition that purely prospective relief may have as potentially devastating
fiscal and structural effects on state governments as retroactive relief.28'
Edelman tried to distinguish between the "ancillary effect that state com'
pliance with federal law would necessarily have on the state treasury,

282

from the direct effect monetary payment to private plaintiffs would have on
the same.

23

Whether Edelman's line between prospective and retroactive relief should
be redrawn, is unclear. 2 4 In distinguishing In re Ayers,2 85 Young itself may
have provided a basis for distinguishing prospective relief which simply
enjoins unconstitutional state government conduct, from other forms of
prospective relief compelling state officials to conform to an articulated plan
devised by the federal court.286 Moreover, Justice Harlan's strong dissent in

278. Id. at 162-63.
279. Id. at 159-60.

280. 415 U.S. at 664-66 (eleventh amendment focuses on damages in favor of private plaintiffs
which must be paid from "general revenues" of a state treasury, regardless of whether suit is
brought in law or equity). See also Tribe, supra note 6, at 687 ("the operational concept of a
sovereign immunity that is secure against judicial inroads has been retained in at least the core
area of damage suits").
281. Id. at 665-67.
282. Id. at 667.
283. Id. at 668. In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979), the Court reaffirmed the
distinction Edelman made between permissible and impermissible forms of relief under the
eleventh amendment. In Quern, the plaintiff class argued that they were entitled to notice that
they had been possibly deprived of welfare benefits in violation of applicable law. Id. at 33940. On the basis of the distinction between retroactive and prospective relief, the Court affirmed
a lower court which ordered state officials to mail notices of the availability of state adminis-

trative procedures by which the injured members of the plaintiff class could get redress. Id. at
344-45. Quern held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permitted a private plaintiff to seek only prospective
relief against a state in federal court. Id. at 345.
284. See generally Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v.

Jordan: A Trip Through the Twilight Zone, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 364 (1982).
285. 123 U.S. 443 (1887). See 209 U.S. at 159 (distinguishing between injunctions in which
"affirmative action of any nature is directed" and injunctions which prevent the "doing of an
act which [the state officer] had no legal right to do").
286. The precise contours of this self-limitation are unclear. In In re Ayers, Virginia passed

legislation in 1882 prohibiting state tax collectors from accepting certain coupons, issued under
statutes previously passed in 1871, to discharge state tax obligations. Id. at 446-47. Private
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Young concerning the structural consequences of prospective relief for states

as separate sovereigns may provide a basis for limiting federal court prospective relief based on federal law. 28 7 Federal court prospective relief may
indeed be substantially more intrusive into and burdensome on state govern-

288
ment than any form of retroactive relief. For example, in Milliken v Bradley
the Court held that state officers may be ordered by a federal court to spend

funds from the state treasury to institute educational programs to desegregate
public schools according to a remedy devised by a federal court. For struc-

tural reasons relating to the integrity of state government, more onerous
forms of federal court prospective relief might be limited to the furtherance
of the civil rights concerns of the Civil War Amendments. While it might
be argued that Milliken sub silentio invalidated Louisiana v. Jumel,2 9 the
Court has recently cited Jumel with approval in Pennhurst 11,190 suggesting
that Milliken may indeed be containable.
In Louisiana v. JumeP91 out-of-state bondholders brought a private man-

damus suit in federal court against the state auditor, treasurer, and other

plaintiffs brought suit in federal court against the state auditor, attorney general, and state
prosecutors, seeking to enjoin them from prosecuting taxpayers who had been reported delinquent because they tendered the 1871 coupons in payment of state taxes. id. at 446. After the
lower court issued the requested injunctive relief, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the equitable action was in essence against the state. Id. at 504. The Ayers Court held that
"any action founded upon it against defendants who are officers of the State, the object of
which is to enforce [the state's] specific performance by compelling those things to be done by
the defendants [state officials] which, when done, would constitute a performance by the State,
...is in substance against the State itself ....
Id. What is interesting for our purposes is
that Young did not distinguish Ayers on the basis of the absence of allegations of unconstitutional conduct by state officials in Ayers. See 209 U.S. at 151-53. Indeed, even Hans cited
Ayers in a way which suggested that Ayers involved a federal question. See 134 U.S. at 10.
Young explained that the prospective relief demanded by the private plaintiff in Ayers was
constitutionally impermissible because it would have been a federal court injunction in which
"affirmative action of any nature is directed" against state officials and state government. 209
U.S. at 159. Furthermore, the injunctive relief in Ayers would have had a substantial financial
impact on the state because it arguably would have meant payment on a large number of
publicly held obligations.
287. See 209 U.S. at 168-204 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The Young] principle, if firmly
established, would work a radical change in our governmental system. It would inaugurate a
new era in the American judicial system and in the relations of the National and state
governments. It would enable the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official
action of the States as if they were 'dependencies' or provinces. It would place the States of
the Union in a condition of inferiority never dreamed of when the Constitution was adopted
or when the Eleventh Amendment was made a part of the Supreme Law of the Land.").
288. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
289. For example, in Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986 (6th Cir.
1987), Judge Nelson stated that "[allthough it has been afforded many opportunities to do so,
the Supreme Court has never repudiated Louisiana v. Jumel; in literally dozens of subsequent
decisions, on the contrary, the Supreme Court has cited that seminal case or its progeny with
every indication of approval." Id. at 991. Later, Judge Nelson indicated that "Louisiana v.
Jumel is still sound." Id.
290. 465 U.S. at 101.
291. 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
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state officials of Louisiana. The plaintiff bondholders charged that the state's
refusal to pay on certain bonds constituted "an impairment of obligations"
under the contract clause. 292 As for relief, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendant state officials from recognizing the validity of a state constitutional
amendment forbidding an exchange of their "old" state bonds for "new"
state bonds. 293 In holding that the eleventh amendment barred the suit, the
Court disapproved "[federal] jurisdiction over the officers in charge of the
public moneys, so as to control them as against the political power in their
administration of the finances of the State." 294 In discussing the constitutional
implications of a private mandamus suit against the state in federal court,
it indicated that "[tihe remedy sought, in order to be complete, would
require the court to assume all the executive authority of the State, .

.

. and

to supervise the conduct of all persons charged with any official duty in
respect to .

.

. the tax in question until the bonds, principal and interest,

were paid in full .
"..."295The Court went on to say that "the political
power [of the state government] cannot thus be ousted of its jurisdiction
and the judiciary set in its place. ' 296 To the extent that prospective relief
requires a state government and its officials to meet federal obligations
according to an articulated remedy devised by the federal court, such relief
"intrudes" into and effectively operates against the state government. Such
relief, in more extreme cases, bears the potential for displacing state government. Garcia'ssevere curtailment of any effective tenth amendment based
protection for states may lead to the revitalization of Jumel; or at the very
least prompt the Court to examine what forms of federal law based pro29
spective relief the supremacy clause 297 necessarily requires.
The complex litigation in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman299
(Pennhurst II) began in 1974 when a resident of Pennsylvania's Pennhurst
State School & Hospital brought a class action in federal court against state
officials in the state's Department of Public Welfare. 3°° The plaintiff class
charged that conditions at Pennhurst violated federal constitutional and
statutory rights, as well as state statutory rights, and sought broad injunctive
relief from the federal court.30' After the first round of appeal reversing the
Third Circuit's affirmance of a broad federal court remedial order, the Court
remanded the case for a determination as to whether that order could be

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, sec. 10, cl. 1. Id. at 716.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 727-28.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, sec. 2.

298. Federal rights are arguably not all alike. For example, federal statutory rights would
seem to present less justification for intrusive federal court prospective relief than federal
constitutional rights.
299. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
300. Id. at 92.
301. Id.
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supported by federal constitutional or statutory law, or state law. 30 2 Affirming
the remedial order in its entirety, the Third Circuit determined that it was

sufficiently undergirded by the "least restrictive environment" standard
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and did not analyze other

possible bases in federal law.30 3 The Third Circuit rejected an eleventh
amendment defense, reasoning that since Ex parte Young permitted prospective relief on the basis of federal law, it would also permit prospective
relief respecting a pendent state-law claim.3°4

Writing for the majority, Justice Powell in PennhurstII rejected this logic,
and held the eleventh amendment forbade the federal courts from issuing
purely prospective relief based on state law against unconsenting state governments, 0 5 despite any possible implications of Edelman or Young in this

regard. What the implications of Pennhurst I are for federal law based
prospective relief is unclear. To be sure, PennhurstII distinguished Edelman

30 6
on the basis that it involved the supremacy clause concerns of federal law.
However, Pennhurst II also suggested that more intrusive forms of purely
prospective relief based on federal law issued by a federal court against a

state might violate the eleventh amendment, if that relief had too great an
adverse effect on the state.30 7 Moreover, in suggesting that crucial structural
considerations should guide eleventh amendment analysis respecting federal
court prospective relief against state government,30 s Pennhurst II implied
that even federal law based prospective relief having significant structural
consequences for state government would be barred by the eleventh amendment.
Justice Powell apparently established in PennhurstII a test which measures
the "effect" a 9 federal court prospective relief may have on a state govern-

ment. Indeed, he seems to have returned to the logic of Jumel insofar as
whether a suit is against the state does not necessarily pivot on the allegation

of unconstitutional state action, but the structural "effect" that the relief

302. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) ("Pennhurst I").
303. 673 F.2d 647 (1982) (en banc).
304. 465 U.S. at 96.
305. Id. at 104-06.
306. Id. at 106.
307. Id. at 104 n.13 ("We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law, but we note that
the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism.
'Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be
constantly mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law.."") (citation omitted). See also id. at
105 ("the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the
constitutional immunity of the States").
308. Id. at 100 ('principles of federalism ... inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine."')
(citation omitted). See also id. at 116-17 ("the Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the federal
judicial power is based in large part on 'the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other."') (citation omitted).
309. Id. at 101 n.it, 101-02, 107, 117 ("impact directly on the State itself").
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asked for would have on the state government. Though developed in the
context of state law based prospective relief, the "effect" test would seem
to have implications for purely prospective relief based on federal law as
well. Indeed, by severely limiting the Young fiction as the general criterion

for determining whether a private suit is "against the state," 310 and potentially
barred by the eleventh amendment, Pennhurst II may bring coherence and
strength to eleventh amendment law. Justice Powell made it very clear that
the eleventh amendment is not, as McVey phrased it, "a pragmatic effort

at line-drawing," '' but instead, a principled constitutional doctrine.

By disfavoring the Young fiction," 2 Pennhurst II has made eleventh

amendment law more amenable to other federalism doctrines regulating the
federal courts' power to issue purely prospective relief based on federal law

against state government. In according legitimacy and respect to state courts
' 31 4
as an essential judicial system in our federal union," 3 "Our Federalism
parallels eleventh amendment jurisprudence. Under Our Federalism and

current eleventh amendment law, the assumption that a private plaintiff
raising federal claims against a state in state court will not receive a full and
fair opportunity to litigate those claims is questionable.3 5 Tne extent to
which Pennhurst H's implications, and the various parallels between Our

Federalism and eleventh amendment law, will result in greater protection for
states from federal court prospective relief remains to be seen. Indeed, if
"constitutional" 31 6 "principles of federalism . . . underlie the Eleventh
310. Id. at 113 ("at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an error of law by state
officers acting in their official capacities will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of
the State where the relief effectively is against it." (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690, 695 (1949)).
311. 812 F.2d at 322.
312. 465 U.S. at 114 n.25 ("[the Young fiction] is a very narrow exception").
313. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
314. Outside the eleventh amendment context, under the rubric of "Our Federalism," the
Court has issued forth a body of decisions, which indicates that the federal interest in enforcing
the supremacy clause by means of "prospective relief" (declaratory or injunctive) against a
state must, under certain circumstances, yield to the state interest in enforcing its own criminal
and civil laws. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Court held that a federal court
should abstain from interference in already begun, or ongoing, state criminal proceedings);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) ("Our Federalism" governs state civil
proceedings where "[tihe State is a party to the . . . proceedings, and the proceeding is both
in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes"; the civil action here was the abatement of
obscene movie theatre as a nuisance). See also Baker, supra note 6, at 173-75.
315. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 47-49. Recently, in Pennzoil Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S.
Ct. 1519 (1987), the Court held that federal courts should not interfere with the execution of
state court judgments when the plaintiff cannot meet its burden of demonstrating that the state
courts will not hear its federal constitutional claims. In the major eleventh amendment case of
Atascadero, Justice Powell indicated that it denigrated state judges to imply that they would
not enforce the supreme law of the land. 473 U.S. at 238 n.2. Dissenting in Young, Justice
Harlan stated forcefully that "[w]e must assume-a decent respect for the States requires us
to assume-that the state courts will enforce every right secured by the Constitution." 209 U.S.
at 176.
316. 465 U.S. at 105.

1988]

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Amendment,13 17 rather than principles of "comity" as in Our Federalism,31
further limitation on federal court prospective relief in eleventh amendment
doctrine may have firmer justification. 1 9
D.

The Enigma of Congressional Power and Eleventh Amendment
Immunity: The Bilateral Framework as the Solution?

Insofar as the eleventh amendment has been applied to specific congressional attempts at expanding federal court jurisdiction to include compulsory
private damage suits against states, the Court has expanded Hans. Indeed,
some of the most interesting federalism issues have revolved around this
expansion of Hans. Hans did not involve a specific grant of federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states. 2 0 However, if the jurisdictional deficiency was the lack of any independent state consent, then the
absence of a specific congressional grant of jurisdiction would not have
"
changed the result in Hans.32
' Though current eleventh amendment doctrine
governing congressional power is not free from logical problems, the Court,
in this author's view, has striven to remain true to the essence of Hans: that
an unconsenting state may not be sued by a private plaintiff for damages in
22
federal court.
Over the last three decades, the Court has struggled, it would seem, to
develop a coherent framework for the analysis of the eleventh amendment
issues raised when Congress specifically authorizes federal jurisdiction over
private damage suits against state governments. This has occurred in the
context where states have neither explicitly waived their eleventh amendment
immunity in their respective state constitutions or state statutes, 323 nor intend
to expressly waive their eleventh amendment immunity by making an individual appearance for that purpose in federal court.3 21 Since requiring Congress to clearly specify its authorization of federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits against states, 323 the Court has resorted to statutory construction

317. Id. at 106.
318. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
319. But see McVey, 812 F.2d at 322 ("principles of comity, rather than strict constitutional
restraints, underlie the decisions of the Supreme Court.
320. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
321. See id.
322. 134 U.S. 1, 9-21.
323. In Atascadero, Justice Powell devoted a portion of the decision to the issue of whether
the State of California had consented to be sued in federal court through a provision in its
own constitution. 473 U.S. at 241. The Court held that a state must express such a waiver in
"unequivocal" language in state law. See id. at 238 n.l.
324. E.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (state may waive its eleventh amendment
immunity by appearing in federal court, and clearly stating through its counsel that it intends
to waive its eleventh amendment immunity). Id. at 17-19.
325. 107 S. Ct. at 2948; 473 U.S. at 243.
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for resolution of eleventh amendment federalism problems. 2 6 The Court has
thus far been able to avoid squarely confronting the issue of congressional
power to remove a state's eleventh amendment immunity in the commerce
clause context, and in the article I context more generally.
Nonetheless, modern eleventh amendment doctrine has emphasized the
importance of the source of congressional power used to authorize federal
jurisdiction over private damage suits against states;327 and has suggested
that independent state consent, when relevant, is an essential element in
determining whether federal court jurisdiction exists over private damage
suits against state governments.32 In the article I context, a bilateral framework consisting of clear congressional authorization of private suits against
29
states in federal court and independent state consent has been developing.
Union Gas IP3° and McVey33' failed to acknowledge even the outlines of
framethis development. In the fourteenth amendment context, a unilateral
33 2
work of clear congressional authorization has been established.
Parden v. Terminal Railway Company,333 decided in 1964, was the first
case to deal with issues of congressional power under the commerce clause
and the eleventh amendment. In the context of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA),3 4 the Court seemed to suggest that Congress's power
to create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states was
absolute. 3 However, it also suggested the necessity of independent state
consent. 3 6 Hence, it implied that Congress alone could not create federal

326. In the most recent case of Welch, Justice Powell was not compelled to rule on whether
Congress possessed the power, under the commerce clause, to force an unconsenting state into
federal court to answer to private damage suits based on the Jones Act, since Congress had
not spoken clearly enough in that statute to authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage
suits. 107 S. Ct. at 2947.
327. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238; Fitpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-53.
328. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672; Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
329. Commerce clause power, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3: Parden, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (FELA);
Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (1966 Amendments to the FLSA); Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2941
(1987) (Jones Act). Spending clause power, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 2: Edelman, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(AABD program); Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147
(1981) (Medicaid program); Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234, 236-37 (1985) (Rehabilitation Act).
330. 832 F.2d at 1346-53.
331. 812 F.2d at 323-26.
332. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, sec. 5: Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (1972 Amendments
to Title VII); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (§ 1983); Atascadero, 373 U.S. 234, 24246 (1985) (Rehabilitation Act). Professor Brown criticized commentators of the congressional
supremacist school for their inability to recognize that the distinction among the various sources
of congressional powers used to authorize federal jurisdictions over private damage suits against
states existed within eleventh amendment law. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst, supra note 16,
at 392-93 n.290. In a subsequent article, however, Professor Brown adheres to that criticism,
but feels that after Atascadero the distinction is "no longer tenable." Brown, State Sovereignty,
supra note 14, at 393 n.244.
333. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
334. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
335. Id. at 191.
336. Id. at 192.
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jurisdiction over private damage suits against states. While the 1973 eleventh
amendment-commerce clause case of Employees v. Department of Public
Health and Welfare 37 acknowledged the bilateral framework nascent in
Parden,3 8 it suggested that Congress could bring "the States to heel" 33 9 by
alone creating private damage suits against them in federal court under the
1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 34° Edelman v.
Jordan,3 41 involving a spending clause program called the Aid to the Aged,
Blind or Disabled (AABD) funded by the Social Security Act,3 42 appeared
to cast doubt on this ambiguous language in Employees by reaffirming the
bilateral framework.3 43 The Edelman Court suggested, moreover, that the
eleventh amendment had not only constitutional dimension, but conferred
"constitutional rights" on state government which Congress is bound to
respect.44 Both post-Garciacases of Welch3 45 and Atascadero346 have quoted
this language from Edelman with approval.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,3 4' decided in 1976, is the only eleventh amendment
decision to address directly the issue of congressional power to create federal
jurisdiction over private damage suits against states. In the context of the
1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,34 the Court held that
Congress may create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against
state government, regardless of state consent. 49 However the Fitzpatrick
Court confined this special ability to the fourteenth amendment enforcement
power. a 0 In 1981, Florida Department of Health v. FloridaNursing Home
" ' a spending clause
Association,35
case involving the Medicaid program, appeared to affirm the Edelman Court's suggestion that both clear congressional authorization and independent state consent were required to create

337. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
338. 411 U.S. at 280 n.1.
339. Id. at 283.

340. Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966).
341. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
342. The Edelman Court described the program as follows: "AABD is one of the categorical
aid programs administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid pursuant to the Illinois
Public Aid Code, ILL. REV. STAT., c. 23 §§ 3-1 through 3-12 (1973). Under the Social Security
Act, the program is funded by the State and Federal Governments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385."
415 U.S. at 653.
343. Id. at 672. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst, supra note 16, at 386 ("the Edelman Court
suggested that both congressional intent and some form of state consent to the removal of
[eleventh amendment] immunity were necessary"). In addition, the Edelman Court referred to
the case of Pardenwhen suggesting that both congressional intent and independent state consent
were necessary to remove eleventh amendment immunity, See 415 U.S. at 672.
344. 415 U.S. at 673.
345. 107 S. Ct. at 2945-46.

346. 473 U.S. at 238 n.1.
347. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

348. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (a)-(g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
349. Id. at 456.
350. Id.
351. 450 U.S. 147 (1981).
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private damage suits against state government in
federal jurisdiction over
352

the article I context.

Shortly after Garcia'svirtual obliteration of any effective tenth amendment
based protection for states,35 3 and in the same Supreme Court Term, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 54 was decided. It held that Congress had
not authorized private damage suits in federal court in the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 311 whether the Act represented an exercise of the spending
clause3 56 or the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 57 It thus
kept alive the possibility that the Court would clearly and unambiguously
find that Congress could not do in an exercise of article I power what it
could do in an exercise of section five of the fourteenth amendment; that
is, unilaterally create federal court jurisdiction over private damage suits
against state government. In 1987, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and
358 a commerce clause case, only heightened the anticPublic Transportation,
ipation by continuing to keep alive the possibility of an eleventh amendment
based affirmative limit on the commerce clause. There, the Court held that
Congress had not authorized private damage suits against states in federal
court under the Jones Act,33 9 and explicitly reserved judgment on the relationship between state consent and congressional power.3 6
Though not without ambiguity, 3 6' eleventh amendment law may be read
to establish the independence of the element of state consent in a bilateral
framework for article I power.3 62 This bilateral framework would recognize
352. Id. at 149-50.
353. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
354. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
355. See Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, amended by 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
356. Id. at 246-47.
357. Id. at 242-46.
358. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
359. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (as amended 1982). Id. at 2947.
360. Id. at 2946.
361. See, e.g., Field, Part Two, supra note 6, at 1212 ("The most basic problem is that the
Court seems to endorse both Congress's power to impose suit and the necessity for state consent
to suit.") (emphasis in original)). Professor Field has also said that "[it appears that whenever
a valid congressional enactment imposes suit, the Court will infer the states' consent to suit.
But since the Court's holding has never actually rested upon congressional power to impose
suit in a situation like Government Employees where it is particularly difficult to find state
consent ... one cannot be certain that a fictional consent to support congressional power will
always be found.") Id. at 1227. External problems relate to the preclusive effect of Garcia.
See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 393 (suggesting that were the Court to find
independent power of state to withhold consent, eleventh amendment law and Garcia would
indeed be in conflict). See also Skover, Phoenix Rising, supra note 16, at 303 (suggesting that
"implied waiver" approach-which recognizes independent state consent-to issues regarding
congressional power to create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states may
undermine presumption in Garcia that the national political process is sole safeguard of state
sovereignty).
362. See Skover, Phoenix Rising, supra note 16, at 301 n.106; id. at 303 ("[eleventh
amendment] doctrine recognizes an independent power of the states to withhold consent to
suit").
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the independent right of a state to withhold consent from federal court
jurisdiction over a private damage suit against it, despite congressional
authorization of that jurisdiction. It might seem anomalous that Congress
is even permitted to authorize private damage suits against states in federal
court at all under this eleventh amendment analysis. However, the bilateral
framework would affirmatively prevent both Congress and federal courts
from creating federal court jurisdiction over compulsory private damage suits
against states because the framework honors the state's right to independently
consent to federal jurisdiction. To the extent that it would guarantee to the
states immunity from compulsory private damage suits in federal court, the
bilateral framework is an outgrowth of Hans; and indeed may also be
understood as a modern response to the majority Justices in Chisholm and
as a vindication of Justice Iredell's dissent which arguably recognized inde3 63
pendent state consent as a necessary constitutional jurisdictional predicate.
To the extent that the bilateral framework would affirmatively limit Congress's power to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts, it would find mooring
in the principle that the eleventh amendment "limits the grant of judicial
authority in Art. III." 64 In this author's view, the bilateral framework bears
the potential for bringing a measure of unity to eleventh amendment doctrine.
As explained below, Congress's "unilateral" power to create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states in an exercise of the fourteenth amendment is special, and limitable to the furtherance of the civil
65
rights concerns of the fourteenth amendment.1

III.

Welch, Parden, AND Employees: A

BILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT-COMMERCE

CLAUSE ANALYSIS?

Union Gas IP66 and McVey 367 refused to acknowledge those aspects of the
eleventh amendment-commerce clause cases of Welch, Parden and Employees, which support a state's independent right to consent, or to withhold
consent, to federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against it. Welch,
Parden and Employees may, however, be read coherently to support a
bilateral framework for eleventh amendment analysis under the article I
power to regulate interstate commerce.
In the most recent eleventh amendment case of Welch, a private plaintiff
sued a state for damages in federal court under the Jones Act, 36s a federal
statute passed pursuant to the commerce power. The state raised the eleventh
amendment defense, and the district court dismissed the suit 369 which, on

363.
364.
365.
366.

See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 98.
See infra notes 470-500 and accompanying text.
See 832 F.2d at 1346-47, 1350-51.

367. See 812 F.2d at 325.
368. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (as amended 1982).
369. 533 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.Tex. 1982).
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appeal, the federal circuit affirmed.1 70 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, affirmed the circuit, and held that Congress had not spoken clearly
enough on the face of the statute to authorize federal jurisdiction over
private damage suits against a state.3 71 As did Employees in considering the
1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act,37 Welch focused exclusively on whether clear congressional authorization of federal jurisdiction
over private damage suits against states existed in the Jones Act.3 71 Welch
ventured no answer as to what independent state consent might mean in the
circumstances of the case. In terms of the bilateral framework, it could be
argued that since Congress had not authorized federal jurisdiction over
private damage suits against the states in the Jones Act,3 74 the issue of
whether the state independently consented to federal jurisdiction, or waived
37
its eleventh amendment immunity was not before the Court.
While Welch expressed reluctance to decide whether Congress could, in
an exercise of the commerce clause, compel a state to defend a private
damage suit in federal court, 76 neither Parden nor Employees satisfactorily
clarified this major unanswered issue. While Welch overruled the part of
Parden which implied that Congress could authorize private damage suits
against states in federal court with less than clear language on the face of
the statute,3 77 it arguably left the state consent aspect of Parden intact.
In Parden, Congress enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)3 78
in an exercise of the commerce clause twenty years before Alabama entered
the railroad industry. An employee of the state-owned railroad sued Alabama
for damages in federal court under FELA. The state raised the eleventh
amendment defense. However, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
held that the state's subsequent entry into an area already subject to federal
regulation providing for private damage suits in federal court, constituted a
3 79
constructive waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity.

370. 780 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1986) (rehearing en banc led to a reversal of previous decision
on same issue in 739 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1984)).
371. 107 S. Ct. at 2947.

372. See infra notes 395-401 and accompanying text.
373. 107 S. Ct. at 2946-48.
374. Id. at 2947.
375. Id. at 2946. Justice Powell stated that "the question of whether the State of Texas has
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity is not before us."
376. Id.
377. Id. at 2948.
378. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
379. Id. at 192-93. Parden introduced the concept of "constructive consent" into eleventh
amendment analysis respecting congressional enactments. However, in Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), the Court first adopted the notion that states
may impliedly consent to be sued for damages by private plaintiffs in federal court. There, the
Court held that the states of Tennessee and Missouri waived their eleventh amendment immunity
by joining in an interstate compact subject to Congress's approval. Id. at 281-82. The sue-andbe-sued clause in the compact was sufficiently clear for the Petty Court to imply that the states,
in accepting the interstate compact, consented to be sued for damages by private plaintiffs in
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Parden'sholding may be understood as an application of a nascent bilateral
framework: (1) the determination that Congress authorized private damage
suits against states in federal court under FELA; s0 and (2) the determination
that the state, through its independent actions, consented to those suits in
federal court. 3"' Read this way, Parden arguably supports the principle that
Congress's power to create federal jurisdiction over private damage actions
against states in an exercise of the commerce clause power is limited by a
state's independent right to consent, or to withhold consent, to such jurisdiction.
However, the Parden rationale underlying the holding contains a certain
'
logical problem, or a "schizophrenic approach," 382
as Professor Tribe has
called it. On the one hand, Justice Brennan maintains that the power of
Congress under the commerce clause is absolute,3"3 and on the other, that
the eleventh amendment both applies to and limits this power.38 4 Thus, the
holding would seem to be in tension with its supporting rationale.
Perhaps the key to understanding Parden is the recognition of two very
different kinds of state sovereignty. The difference between "common law
sovereign immunity," and the constitutional immunity of the eleventh amendment has been offered as one solution.385 When Justice Brennan writes that
the "States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce," 3 6 he seems to be referring to
the common law sovereign immunity that the states surrendered to the federal
government in the ratification of the Constitution. The surrender of this
fundamental attribute of sovereignty permitted Congress to regulate the
states, and, within certain constitutional limits, to create substantive rights
in private plaintiffs against the states.
However, what the states surrendered in the ratification of the Constitution
would not necessarily have included the jurisdictional protection for states
expressed in the eleventh amendment: immunity from compulsory private

federal court. Id. at 280. Hence, the introduction of constructive consent into eleventh amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has recently expressed a strong disfavor for the notion
of constructive consent in eleventh amendment law. See Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2945; Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 238 n.l.

380. 377 U.S. at 190.
381. Id. at 192.
382. Tribe, supra note 6, at 688.
383. 377 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936)).
384. Id. at 192.
385. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 280-81 n.l ("common law sovereign immunity" is distinguished from eleventh amendment immunity); id. at 287-88 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring
in the result) (concurrence based on distinction between common law sovereign immunity and
eleventh amendment immunity). See also Brown, Beyond Pennhurst, supra note 16, at 364;
Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974 DuKE L.J. 925,
942-50.
386. 377 U.S. at 191.
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damage suits in federal court.38 7 Alternatively, if such protection were included in that set of powers initially surrendered, it was arguably taken back
by the states in the ratification of the eleventh amendment in 1795.388 Parden
certainly suggests the former, if not the latter historical theory. 8 9 Without
at least the distinction between what was surrendered at the Constitution's
ratification and what the eleventh amendment represents, logically it is
impossible to explain why something which has been surrendered could have
any effect on the commerce power of Congress. Yet, Parden explicitly stated
that the eleventh amendment is "not here being overridden." 3 9 Moreover,
insofar as Parden implicitly measured whether the state's independent actions
constituted the state's consent,39' it implied that the state had an immunity
to be consented away in relation to a congressional enactment under the
commerce clause. Such an interpretation of Parden is specifically reinforced
by the statement in the text of the opinion that "it remains the law that a
State may not be sued by an individual without its consent. 3 92 In addition,
the above language appears after the discussion of the "plenary" commerce
power,3 9 which suggests that while the commerce power is, within certain
limits, plenary regarding the creation of substantive rights in private plaintiffs
against states, it is not necessarily plenary regarding the creation of federal
jurisdiction over the enforcement of those rights against states.
Nothing in the Parden decision would necessarily preclude a limit of the
kind contemplated by this Article in circumstances where a state has already
entered an area which subsequently becomes federally regulated with provision for federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states. Indeed,
it can reasonably be argued that had the state already entered the railroad
industry at the time Congress enacted FELA, no independent state consent
could be found. The state could not be said to have had any prior knowledge
of the possibility of private damage suits in federal court, because the statute
authorizing such suits would not yet have been in existence; but neither
could the state be said to have voluntarily consented to clear congressional
authorization of such suits by its continuance in the regulated activity, where

387. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 288 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in the result)
(constitutional protection represented by the eleventh amendment was not among those things
surrendered to federal government in ratifying the Constitution).
388. On the theory that if the constitutional protection represented by the eleventh amendment
was surrendered by the states to the federal government in the ratification of the Constitution,
it was certainly taken back by them in the adoption of the eleventh amendment.
389. 377 U.S. at 192. Justice Brennan also said later in the opinion that "[a] State's immunity
from suit by an individual without its consent has been fully recognized by the Eleventh
Amendment and by subsequent decisions of this Court." Id. at 196. However, Justice Brennan
has dramatically changed his views about the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S.
Ct. at 2958 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
390. Id. at 192.
391. Id.
392. Id. (emphasis added).

393. Id.
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the state had already committed personnel and resources to the activity.3 94
Nine years after Parden, the Court decided Employees 95 another difficult
and enigmatic decision. The Employees Court held that Congress had not
spoken with sufficient clarity in amending § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938396 to authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage suits
against state governments.197 Language in Employees seemed to suggest that
Congress could "lift ' 3 98 the eleventh amendment immunity of a state and
force that state to defend a private damage suit in federal court. In a
footnote, however, Employees recognized the bilateral framework of congressional authorization and independent state consent predicated in Parden. 399
While Employees explicitly specified that Congress must speak clearly to
authorize federal jurisdiction over private damages suits against state governments,4°° it was reticent "on the state consent side of the bilateral framework. The absence of any discussion of state consent does not, however,
necessarily imply that Employees had abandoned the bilateral framework of
Parden. On the contrary, this silence is explicable in terms of the bilateral
framework: since no congressional authorization of private damage suits in
federal court in the 1966 FLSA Amendments had occurred, no need existed
for the Employees Court to address the issue of independent state consent. 4 1
That Congress had not even authorized federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits against states in the FLSA is thus the only interpretation of
Employees which confines itself to the holding.
In contrast to the position of this Article, Professor Field has advanced
an interpretation of Employees which assumes that the Court eschewed any
notion that state consent was a meaningful, independent predicate of eleventh
amendment analysis. She assumed that the only satisfying interpretation
of Employees was one which "imput[ed] to the states a fictional consent
when [the Court] finds that Congress has imposed [private] suit" against
states in federal court. 40a There are problems with Professor Field's interpretation, not the least of which is its assumption that the issue of state
consent had been reached by the Employees Court. Under her analysis, the
concept of "fictional consent" is assumed to be consistent with Parden's
notion of state consent; such fictional consent would be satisfied simply by
the state's continuance in the activity subsequently made subject to federal

394. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 296-97 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
395. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
396. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (s)(4) (1964 ed., Supp. I).
397. 411 U.S. at 285.
398. Id. at 285-86.
399. Id. at 280-81 n.I.
400. Id. at 285.
401. See Skover, Phoenix Rising, supra note 16, at 300.
402. Field, Part Two, supra note 6, at 1218.
403. Id.
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regulation providing for private damage suits against states in federal court. 40 4
Parden's notion of state consent, however, may be interpreted to require
that the state's entry into an area already subject to federal regulation be
both knowing and voluntary. 40 1 In Employees on the other hand, Missouri
was already engaged in the activity of running hospitals and schools when
Congress regulated that activity in an exercise of the commerce clause
power;4 the state had already committed personnel and resources to the
activity before Congress legislated the 1966 FLSA Amendments. By implying
that the predicate of state consent could be satisfied under such circumstances, Professor Field's reading of Employees is not only inconsistent with
Parden, but would effectively emasculate the eleventh amendment in its
relationship to the commerce power.
Professor Tribe suggests that Employees necessarily "reaffirmed Congress'
power to bring 'the States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity

from suit in a federal court'

. .

. .40

However, this view rests on question-

able assumptions about the Parden decision. Indeed, in acknowledging its
"schizophrenic approach, ' 40 8 Professor Tribe implicitly admits that Parden
may be read for the proposition that independent state consent is a necessary
predicate in eleventh amendment analysis. Interpreted in terms of the holding,
Employees therefore stands only for the proposition that Congress had not
authorized federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states in the
FLSA; 409 the first prong of the bilateral framework had not been satisfied.
The language about bringing the states "to heel" on which Professor Tribe's
view of Employees fundamentally rests4t0 therefore is dicta. If Congress may
"lift" a state's eleventh amendment immunity in an exercise of its commerce
clause power, as Professor Tribe has maintained, not only would Employees
41
arguably contradict Parden, but Fitzpatrick too. '
IV. A tascadero's IMPLICATIONs FOR A BILATERAL FRAMEWORK
The discussion of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon412 in Union Gas
44
41143 and McVey"
assumes that Congress, so long as it speaks clearly, may
compel a state to defend a private damage suit in federal court, regardless
of any consent by the state, and irrespective of the source of constitutional
power used by Congress. Far from necessarily invalidating the concept of

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id.at 1214-18.
See supra notes 391-94 and accompanying text.
411 U.S. at 296-97 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
Tribe, supra note 6, at 689.
Id.at 688.
See supra note 401 and accompanying text.
Id. at 689.
See 427 U.S. at 456. See infra notes 505-08 and accompanying text.
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
See 832 F.2d at 1345-46.
See 812 F.2d at 324-26.

19881

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

independent state consent, Atascadero, however, both directly and indirectly
supports it.' Directly confirming Fitzpatrick's constitutional distinction between article I and fourteenth amendment power, 4 6 Atascadero suggests that
while the states' eleventh amendment protection may have been diminished
regarding the fourteenth amendment, that protection has not been diminished
regarding article I power. Atascadero, in the final analysis, thus supports

the bilateral framework for the commerce clause inherent in Welch, Parden
and Employees,4 7 and more generally contains the outlines of a general
framework for analyzing eleventh amendment issues concerning congressional
power.
A.

Independent State Consent and Congressional Power

In Atascadero, a private plaintiff sought damages, among other relief,

against a state in federal court under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.418 The state raised the defense that the eleventh amendment barred
the federal court from entertaining the plaintiff's claims. 4 9 The district court
agreed with the eleventh amendment argument, and granted the state defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction.4 20 After the federal
court of appeals reversed the district court, 42' the state appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Court, led by Justice Powell, reversed the federal
appellate court, and held that the eleventh amendment, which embodied
fundamental constitutional interests of states, 422 barred the federal court
from hearing private damage suits under the above federal statute, regardless
of whether that statute was passed in an exercise of the article I power to
spend for the general welfare, 421 or the enforcement power of the fourteenth
amendment.4 24 The Atascadero Court was not compelled to address the issue

415. Id. at 246-47. Id. at 247 ("clear [congressional] intent" and "State's consent to waive
its [eleventh amendment] immunity") (emphasis added).
416. Id. at 242-43.
417. See supra notes 366-411 and accompanying text.

418. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (as amended 1978).
419. 473 U.S. at 236.
420. Id.
421. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 234
(1985). It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit previously held in the state defendant's favor,
on the ground that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, was inapplicable unless
the provision of employment was the primary objective of the federal financial assistance at
issue. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). In Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984), the Supreme Court vacated this judgment, and
remanded in light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
422. 473 U.S. at 238. In the text of the opinion, Justice Powell stated that the eleventh
amendment "implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government
and the States." In a considerable footnote, Justice Powell explained eleventh amendment
doctrine as "necessary to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers of the
Constitution." Id. at 238-40 n.2.
423. Id. at 247.
424. Id.at 246.
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of whether the federal statute was passed pursuant to the spending clause
or the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, since Congress, by not
speaking clearly, failed to authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage
425
suits against state government in any case.
That the Atascadero Court did not explicitly discuss the concept of independent state consent does not necessarily suggest that it had abandoned
it. If the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 represented an exercise of the article I

spending clause power, any discussion of independent state consent may
have been unnecessary under the bilateral framework. Since the Act failed
to authorize federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against state
government, 426 Congress had not intended to "abrogate" the state's eleventh

amendment immunity. 427 Since no abrogation was intended, the Court was
thus not required to address whether the state had voluntarily "consented
to the abrogation of [its eleventh amendment] immunity ' 42 by accepting
funds under the statute.
Atascadero's requirement of clear congressional authorization for spending power analysis does not necessarily suggest that Congress may "condition
participation in the programs funded [in a spending power package] on a
State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity, ' 429 just so long as its
speaks clearly. If Congress possessed such power, one might argue that
Atascadero rendered any notion of independent state consent in the prior
cases of Parden and Employees, if not theoretically invalid, practically
meaningless. However, Atascadero may provide no basis for making any

inferences on the issue, since no need existed to address the issue of Con-

425. The Atascadero Court did not have to decide the issue of what specific enumerated
power the Congress used in passing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. One might suspect that
such an analysis will have implications for the controversy over the so-called Katzenbach power
of the Congress. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Were the Court forced to decide
what power the Congress used in enacting federal legislation, the Court would have to develop
a set of criteria respecting what constitutes a reasonable use of that particular power. Inherent
within such criteria will be judgments as to the boundaries of the source of the power, i.e.,
U.S. Cors. amend. XIV, sec. 5. The Court could then begin to establish the parameters of

what Justice Powell has called "the usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government." 473 U.S. at 242. It might then be possible to begin to reconcile the
vision of Jefferson with the Civil War Amendments born in the era of Lincoln.
426. Id. at 247.

427. In Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672, Justice Rehnquist used the terminology of "abrogation"
to refer to the Congress's intention to authorize private damage suits against states in federal
court.
428. 415 U.S. at 672.
429. 473 U.S. at 247. Indeed, this language in Atascadero appears to suggest that the Congress
possesses such a power: "[tihe Act likewise falls short of manifesting a clear intent to condition
participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity." Professor Brown has argued that Atascadero necessarily suggests that the
Court would "find a waiver by the state of its eleventh amendment protection" from clear
congressional authorization of private damage suits in federal court in the statute's face,
regardless of whether the state's acceptance of the monies was truly voluntary. See Brown,
State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 385.
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gress's power under the spending clause in relation to the eleventh amendment. One would suspect, moreover, that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions would provide a strong argument against any inference of Congress's absolute power to condition a state's receipt of benefits on the
4 0
relinquishment of its constitutional rights under the eleventh amendment. 1
On the other hand, if Atascadero implies that Congress possesses such
power to condition for spending clause enactments, this would not necessarily
imply a similar power for enactments under the commerce clause. While the
spending clause power is inherently bilateral, the commerce clause is inherently coercive. While a state arguably makes a knowing and voluntary
decision to give up its rights under the eleventh amendment in accepting
"money and benefits" in a spending power package, nothing analogous can
be said about the situation in the commerce clause context. On this basis, a
different nature and degree of state action could reasonably be required to
constitute independent state consent in commerce clause analysis. Thus,
eleventh amendment analysis for spending clause enactments and commerce
clause enactments might significantly differ, yet still be logically accommodated within the notion of independent state consent. Thus, Atascadero does
not necessarily mean that Congress could'condition, in an exercise of the
commerce clause, a state's continuation in a regulated area on the state's
waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity, if that state had already com43
mitted personnel and resources to that activity as in Employees. '
Moreover, Atascadero'sclear congressional authorization requirement might
be justified in terms of an aspect of independent state consent: a state's
knowledge. Clarity in the spending power statute's face, as opposed to clarity
in legislative history, could function in the bilateral framework to put the
state on notice of the possibility of federal jurisdiction over private damage
suits, should it decide to accept funds under the statute.43 2 California could
not have had knowledge of any possible federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits against it arising out of the Rehabilitation Act, 433 since the
facial terms of the Act were unclear in this respect. Far from implying the
absolute power of Congress to create federal jurisdiction over private damage
suits against states, the 'clear statement rule" may represent the subordination of Congress's clear will to a state's independent right to consent to
federal jurisdiction for article I enactments. In this sense, Atascadero con434
firmed one essential aspect of the earlier case of Edelman.
Furthermore, the Atascadero Court may have implicitly acknowledged the
principle of independent state consent in eleventh amendment analysis when

430. See generally Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 321 (1935).
431. See supra notes 402-06 and accompanying text.
432. Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 388 (clarity in the face of the spending
power statute "provides the . . . assurance that the state knows what it is getting into").
433. 473 U.S. at 246.
434. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See infra notes 452-58 and accompanying text.
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that the State consented to suit in

federal court by accepting funds under the Rehabilitation Act. '435 Subsequently, Atascadero stated: (1) "the mere receipt of federal funds cannot
establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court; ' 43 6 (2) "there
was no indication that the State . . consented to federal jurisdiction. 4 37
In characterizing the analysis of the lower court, the Court stated, moreover,
that "by focusing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it
engaged in analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments." 3 s A tascadero's
direct citations to Edelman43 9 also suggest that a state's actions in accepting
funds under a spending statute must be both knowing" and voluntary" 1 to
constitute independent consent in the bilateral framework. Thus, it may be
hazardous to conclude that Atascadero necessarily inferred state consent as
2
an independent element of a bilateral framework."
In Edelman v. Jordan,"3 decided in 1974, a private plaintiff filed a class
action against Illinois in federal court, based on alleged federal constitutional
and statutory violations by state officials in implementing the federal-state
program of the Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled (AABD),4 " funded under
the Social Security Act," 5 enacted pursuant to the article I spending clause
power. The plaintiff class sought equitable relief for all "AABD benefits
wrongfully withheld," " 6 relief which would run directly against the state
treasury. The state had not raised the eleventh amendment defense in the
district court." 7 The district court issued an injunction which required the
payment of damages from the state treasury."8 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
this injunction over the eleventh amendment based objections of the state
defendants raised on appeal. 49
Justice Rehnquist, for a majority of the Court, reversed that portion of
the Seventh Circuit's order requiring payment of damages from the state
treasury. To create federal jurisdiction over what was essentially a private

435. 473 U.S. at 246.
436. Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added).
437. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
438. Id. at 246 n.5 (emphasis added).
439. 473 U.S. at 247 (citing 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
440. See infra notes 452-58 and accompanying text.
441. See infra notes 459-62 and accompanying text.
442. See Skover, Phoenix Rising, supra note 16, at 301 n.106. Professor Sk8ver has stated
in this connection that the cases of Atascadero and Edelman "should not be understood to
take any affirmative stance against a second element in a two-pronged Eleventh Amendment
test that would require evidence of a state's independent waiver of immunity by explicit or
constructive consent."
443. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
444. 42 U.S.C. §§ 801-05 (1970 ed., Supp. II (superseded)).
445. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85.
446. 415 U.S. at 656.
447. Id. at 677.
448. Id.at 656.
449. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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damage suit against the state, he suggested that there must be both clear
congressional authorization of federal jurisdiction over those suits against
states and a state's independent consent to such jurisdiction. 410 Thus, he
explicitly confirmed the existence of a bilateral framework for the article I
spending clause power.

41
1

Justice Rehnquist went on to say that the "mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient
to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal
courts. ' 45 2 Neither the AABD program, nor any provision of the Social
Security Act which funded it,4 1" authorized federal jurisdiction over states
for private damage suits arising out of the package.4 5 4 Edelman thus implied,
as Atascadero did, 45 1 that what the state knows from the relevant statute or
statutes concerning the possibility of private damage suits in federal court is
vitally important. Justices Marshall and Stewart in separate concurrence to
Employees directly confirmed this connection between the two elements of
456
the bilateral framework in the context of the commerce clause power.
Where Congress had not clearly authorized federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits against state governments, they explained, the state government

450. 415 U.S. at 672. Justice Rehnquist used different terminology, yet in this author's
opinion meant the very same thing. He specifically stated that "It]he question of waiver or
consent under the Eleventh Amendment was found in [Parden and Employees] to turn on
whether Congress had intended to abrogate the immunity in question, and whether the State
by its participation in the program authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the
abrogation of the immunity." (emphasis added).
451. Justice Douglas's dissent in Edelman argued that the Edelman plaintiffs were suing
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on an equal protection theory to vindicate their rights guaranteed by
the AABD statute, and implied that the eleventh amendment for that reason ought not to
operate as a jurisdictional bar, 415 U.S. at 678-79. Because § 1983 makes no specific mention
of private damage suits against states in federal court, it could not operate, in any case, to
remove a state's eleventh amendment immunity. Indeed, the Court subsequently held that §
1983 does not operate to negate the states' eleventh amendment protection from compulsory
private damage suits in federal court. Quern. 440 U.S. at 345. Since the Edelman plaintiffs
sought relief payable directly from the state treasury, § 1983 was of no help to them. Justice
Douglas did not, moreover, address the argument that § 1983 is a general remedial statute.
Without the constitutional power to remove unilaterally the states' eleventh amendment immunity in an exercise of article I power, the Congress could not, it would seem, by means of
a general remedial statute such as § 1983, allegedly passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment,
circumvent the eleventh amendment to compel states to defend private damage suits in federal
court based on substantive rights derivative from article I statutes and outside the scope of the
civil rights concerns of the fourteenth amendment. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist noted in Quern
that "[e]xtending § 1983 liability to States obviously would place 'enormous fiscal burdens on
the States."' 440 U.S. at 344-45 n.16 (emphasis in original).
452. 415 U.S. at 673.
453. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85.
454. 415 U.S. at 674.
455. See supra notes 432-33 and accompanying text.
456. 411 U.S. at 287-88.
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could not be held to have "legal notice ' 457 of the possibility of such federal
jurisdiction. Dissenting in Parden, Justice White essentially made this same
point in arguing that waiver of constitutional rights must be both knowing
48
and intelligent.
In analogizing state consent under the eleventh amendment to a "surrender
of constitutional rights, ' 45 9 Justice Rehnquist in Edelman implied that state
consent must be voluntary, as well as knowing, to waive eleventh amendment
protection. In their concurrence to Employees, Justices Marshall and Stewart
recognized that Parden'sconcept of implied state consent approximated "the
sort of voluntary choice which we generally associate with the concept of
constitutional waiver."
One commentator has suggested that "[bly implying that the eleventh amendment guarantees a constitutional right that must
be waived voluntarily, the Court hints at an analysis that would make
[eleventh amendment immunity] almost impregnable to congressional attack. '" 46 By suggesting that state consent must be voluntary, as well as
knowing, Justice Rehnquist in Edelman, and Justices Marshall and Stewart
in their concurrence to Employees, have necessarily established the independence of the state consent requirement of the bilateral framework from
the clear congressional authorization requirement. For the reasons stated
6 2
above, Atascadero supports this conclusion.
B.

Differentiation of Congressional Power

One marked deficiency of Union Gas HI461 McVey, " 4 and the congressional
supremacist view more generally, has been the inability to recognize the
constitutional distinction in sources of congressional power, and assess its
significance for an affirmative limit on congressional power to create federal
jurisdiction over state government.4 5 Atascaderoclearly separated its eleventh
466
amendment analysis under the spending clause power, an article I power,
7
from that under the fourteenth amendment enforcement power.4 It thus
suggested that the two broad sources of congressional power, article I and
the fourteenth amendment, are fundamentally different: in the former, the
bilateral framework of clear congressional authorization and independent

457. Id. at 296.
458. 377 U.S. at 200 (footnote omitted).
459. 415 U.S. at 673.
460. 411 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added).
461. Baker, supra note 6, at 181 n.193.
462. See supra notes 427-42 and accompanying text.
463. See 832 F.2d at 1351-53.
464. See 812 F.2d at 319-21.
465. But see Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 393 n.244. Professor Brown has
said that while he once believed that the distinction in the source of congressional power to
create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states "made sense," "it is no
longer tenable after Atascadero."
466. 473 U.S. at 246-47 (spending clause analysis).
467. Id. at 242-46. See also id. at 244-45 n.4, 246 n.5.
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state consent applies; 468 and in the latter, the unilateral framework of clear
congressional authorization applies. 469
If "Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States'
consent" 470 in an exercise of section five of the fourteenth amendment,
Atascadero implied that Congress's power in the exercise of other sources
of power would be limited by "the States' consent." ' 47' Where the "usual
constitutional balance .between States and the Federal Government," 472 i.e.
article I power, Atascadero suggested that congressional power would be
subject to the full force of the eleventh amendment. 473 Atascadero thus may
be viewed as a tacit rejection of the "congressional supremacist" position;
and further, as a decision after Garcia, a tacit rejection of the recently
expressed view that Garcia renders the source of constitutional power issue
4 75
unimportant. 474 Atascadero quoted language from Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
which more directly suggests that Congress may not subject unconsenting
states to private damage suit in federal court in an exercise of article I
power. 476 Atascadero thus could be said to guard the territory of the other
affirmative limits on federal power over states to which the Garcia Court
477
referred.
In Fitzpatrick, private plaintiffs brought a damage suit against a state in
federal court under the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.471 One of the major issues was whether Congress possessed the
power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment to subject
states to private damage suits in federal court, irrespective of independent
state consent.4 79 The Court held that Congress possessed such power, 4s° but

did not explicitly state how clearly Congress must speak in order to remove
a state's eleventh amendment immunity. Later, Quern v. Jordan48 indicated

468. Id,at 246 n.5 ("by focusing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it
engaged in analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments.").
469. Id. at 238 ("when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States' consent.").
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 242.
473. While McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) implied that Congress's
power under the "necessary and proper" clause was unlimited, that clause is located in article
I, and like the commerce clause and other founts of power in article I, would therefore be
subject to the constitutional restraints of the eleventh amendment.
474. See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 393.
475. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
476. 473 U.S. at 243 (quoting 427 U.S. at 556).
477. 469 U.S. at 556. But see Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 393 (eleventh
amendment affirmative limitation on the commerce clause consistent with Fitzpatrick means
that "Atascadero and Garcia will indeed be in conflict").
478. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a)-(g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
479. 427 U.S. at 448.
480. Id. at 456.
481. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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that, in an exercise of the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, Congress must express its intention to remove the states' eleventh amendment
482
protection clearly in the face of the statute.
In the opinion, Justice Rehnquist was careful to distinguish Congress's
power under the commerce clause from its power under the fourteenth
amendment enforcement provision. 483 He made it absolutely clear that the
1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were passed
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment enforcement clause, and not the
commerce clause power. 4 4 His insistence on distinguishing the power of
Congress under the commerce clause from that under the fourteenth amendment enforcement clause, 4 5 combined with some strong language at the end
of the opinion, 486 suggests that the result of the eleventh amendment analysis
conducted for the fourteenth amendment would not have been the same for
the commerce clause. In this respect, it might be argued that Fitzpatrick
' 47
prefigured Justice Powell's conception of the "usual constitutional balance
in Atascadero.
Clearly implicit in this developing area of eleventh amendment law is the
suggestion that the particular source of congressional power used to authorize
suit raises different issues, depending on that source's relationship to the
eleventh amendment. In Fitzpatrick, Justice Rehnquist wrote the following:
"[w]e think that Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. ' 48 8 In essence, Justice Rehnquist confined congressional power to subject unconsenting states to private
damage suit in federal court to the fourteenth amendment. 4 9 Thus, he
suggested that a commerce clause statute is not in pari materia with a
fourteenth amendment enforcement power statute for purposes of the eleventh amendment.
The distinction in the source of congressional power appears to rest on a
diminution of eleventh amendment state sovereignty, effected in the states'

482. Id. at 343-45 (held that in order to create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits
in an exercise of the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, Congress must express this
intention clearly in the statute; since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not evince clear congressional intent
in this respect, it did not operate to remove a state's eleventh amendment immunity).
483. 427 U.S. at 452-53.
484. Id. at 453.
485. Id. at 452-52.
486. Id. at 456.
487. 473 U.S. at 242.
488. 472 U.S. at 465. (emphasis added).
489. See M. REDISH, supra note 77, at 153, 162 (congressional power to abrogate may, under
current law, be limited to exercise of the fourteenth amendment). See also Baker, supra note
6, at 185 n.209. ("There is growing evidence of the Court's willingness to put limits on
Congress's control over the states' immunity in area outside the fourteenth amendment. The
holding in Fitzpatrick is suggestive .... "). But see Union Gas II, 832 F.2d at 1352.
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ratification of the fourteenth amendment. 4 9 The relevant language in the
opinion is the following: "The [Title VIII legislation . .. was grounded on
the expansion of Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of
state sovereignty [eleventh amendment based]-found to be intended by the
Framers and made part of the Constitution upon the States' ratification of

the Civil War Amendments .

.

. .

49

The Seventh Circuit in McVey argued that plenary grants of power to
Congress are equal limitations on state sovereignty. 492 Thus, it argued that
there was no difference between the plenary powers of the commerce clause
in article I, and section five of the fourteenth amendment. 493 This is not
necessarily so. In regard to the plenary powers in article I of the Constitution,
the chronologically subsequent eleventh amendment could reasonably be
interpreted as a constitutional limitation on those plenary powers. 4 4 The
eleventh amendment may thus be interpreted as an effort by the states either
to take back a particular attribute of state sovereignty, or to articulate and
ensconce in a constitutional amendment an attribute of state sovereignty,
respecting exercises of article I power. Moreover, that state governments
could cede certain elements of their sovereignty respecting one plenary power
but not the other is not an unreasonable proposition. That the states ceded
some or all of their eleventh amendment protection respecting the fourteenth
amendment is supported by not only the chronological fact that the fourteenth amendment was adopted after the eleventh amendment, but also by
the fact that it was intended as a curtailment of existing state sovereignty to
protect certain categories of constitutionally guaranteed individual rights.
Far from representing an exercise in arbitrarily "read[ing] the Constitution
on a timeline, "' 491 reading Fitzpatrickto distinguish Congress's power under
the fourteenth amendment from its power under article I is reasonable,
defensible constitutional interpretation.

490. 427 U.S. at 456 (citations omitted). See P. BATOR, P. MISHYuN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
231 (1981
Supp.) (suggesting that Fitzpatrickwas rightly decided because, as a predicate to congressional
power to abrogate the eleventh amendment, the state legislatures have generally surrendered
their eleventh amendment immunity in a ratification process, article V.). See Note, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Damage Liability Under the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 71 VA. L. REV.
655, 668 (1985) ("The [Fitzpatrick] Court implied that state consent to suit is unnecessary
because the states had already waived a portion of their eleventh amendment immunity by
ratifying the fourteenth amendment."). See also Baker, supra note 6, at 171.
491. Id. at 455-56.
492. 812 F.2d at 321.
493. Id.
494. In the Employees litigation, the Eighth Circuit stated that "[t]o the extent that any
inconsistency exists between the powers granted by the Commerce Clause and the Eleventh
Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment as the more recent expression of the will of the people
should prevail." 452 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 1971). Supporting this kind of constitutional
interpretation, see Casto, The DoctrinalDevelopment of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L.
Q. 227, 228-29 (1949).
495. Union Gas I, 832 F.2d at 1351.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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Union Gas II argued, 496 relying on McVey, 497 that article I power and the
fourteenth amendment were not distinguishable on the basis of the latter's
explicit reference to states.4 98 However, the explicit reference to states in the
fourteenth amendment only buttresses the theory, implicit in Fitzpatrick,
that the states surrendered a portion of their eleventh amendment protection
in ratifying the fourteenth amendment. "[S]tates of the union still possess[]
attributes of sovereignty . . . save where there has been 'a surrender of the

immunity'

...

.499

Moreover, that the states would have surrendered a

portion of the eleventh amendment protection in ratifying the fourteenth
amendment makes structural sense. If the fourteenth amendment were confinable to civil rights concerns, the states' surrender of their eleventh amendment immunity in the fourteenth amendment context would have a limited
effect on eleventh amendment protection for states more generally, and
consequently, a limited effect on the distribution of power in the federal
union. If the enforcement power of the fourteenth amendment is properly
limited to civil rights concerns, the area in which federal courts could assert
jurisdiction over compulsory private damage suits against state government
would become well defined, and over time familiar to state government. In
Atascadero, Justice Powell explicitly indicated that the eleventh amendment,
by limiting the federal judicial power over state government, contributed to
a balance of power between the states and the federal government. 5
Fitzpatrick did not indicate the extent to which eleventh amendment state
sovereignty had been diminished in the ratification of the Civil War Amendments. Recent cases have, however, indicated that it has been diminished to
the extent that state consent is irrelevant in the fourteenth amendment power
contextA01 The fact that the fourteenth amendment does not ex proprio
vigore abrogate eleventh amendment protection for states 02 might suggest
that there is still some eleventh amendment protection to be respected in the
fourteenth amendment context. Because the states do not have the right to
consent independently to federal jurisdiction under the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, the protection they retain might be the right to
clear congressional authorization, on the statute's face, of federal jurisdiction
over private damage suits against them. If eleventh amendment protection
were entirely surrendered by the states in the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, clear congressional authorization must be justified on principles

496.
497.
498.
499.

Id. at 1352.
812 F.2d at 321.
E.g., "No State" and "nor shall any State." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1933) (quoting
FEDERAIST No. 81, at 548 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).

THE

500. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2.

501. 473 U.S. at 238.
502. Congress must express a clear intention to remove the states' eleventh amendment
immunity even when acting pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Quern, 440 U.S. at 345.
Thus, the fourteenth amendment does not by itself operate to remove the states' eleventh
amendment immunity.
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603

independent from the eleventh amendment. Thus, this requirement in the
fourteenth amendment context may not be justified in terms of independent
state consent as in the article I context.503 Nevertheless, it may be underpinned
by the principle that federal courts must guard against expansion in their
own jurisdiction. 5°4
Conversely, the rationale of Fitzpatrick suggests that, because there is no
diminution of eleventh amendment state sovereignty in respect to article I
of the Constitution, the locus of the spending and commerce clause powers,
those powers are fully subject to it. Because no diminution of eleventh
amendment based state sovereignty has occurred in respect to article I, as it
has in respect to the Civil War Amendments, Congress could not, in an
exercise of either commerce or the spending clause powers, constitutionally
subject states to private damage suit in federal court irrespective of independent state consent. Where the "usual constitutional balance ' 50 5 between
the states and federal government obtains, as Justice Powell phrased it in
Atascadero, Congress may not unilaterally strip them of their constitutionally
guaranteed eleventh amendment protection. Indeed, Parden would support
this interpretation of Atascadero and Fitzpatrick, insofar as it suggested that
Congress must respect the principle of independent state consent in the
commerce clause context. 5°6 If the reading advanced by this Article is valid,
Fitzpatrick has clearly invalidated those interpretations of Employees which
assume that Congress, in an exercise of the commerce clause power, may
either "impose a waiver" 50 7 of eleventh amendment immunity, or may
unilaterally "lift" 50 eleventh amendment protection.
V.

ExiREss STATE CONSENT?

If it reverses Union Gas 11,109 the Court will be faced with the problem
of choosing an approach to determining state consent. An implied waiver
approach to eleventh amendment issues governing congressional power may
be one reconciliation of existing eleventh amendment cases, as it preserves
what seems essential to the eleventh amendment: a state's independent right
to consent, or to withhold consent.510 I agree with Professor Skover that an

503. See supra notes 433-34, 453-58 and accompanying text.

504. 473 U.S. at 243.
505. Id. at 242.
506. 377 U.S. at 192. See supra notes 378-81 and accompanying text.
507. See Baker, supra note 6, at 150. ("Under the eleventh amendment, however, not only
can a state waive protection, but recent cases suggest that Congress can impose a waiver on

the states.").
508. 411 U.S. at 283. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 689 (suggesting that Congress may lift
state's eleventh amendment immunity in exercise of the commerce clause).
509. 832 F.2d 1343 (3rd Cir. 1987).
510. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974), Justice Rehnquist analogized rights

accruing to state government under the eleventh amendment to "constitutional rights" which
must be voluntarily surrendered. But see Tribe, supra note 6, at 693 ("[tlhe only ready escape
...is to deny that the state in fact has a right ....").

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37:547

express waiver approach may offer another approach to reconciling the
eleventh amendment case."'
Under an implied waiver approach, independent state consent is a necessary
condition to the creation of federal jurisdiction over private damage suits
2
against state government arising out of the commerce clause regulations."
Assuming no other basis for state consent exists, as in state constitutional
or statutory waiver, or individual appearance by the state in federal court
for that purpose, state consent must be derived from independent state
action: a state government's voluntary entry into an area of activity already
subject to federal regulation, 5 13 where the state government knows from the
terms of the relevant commerce clause statute that the statute provides for
54
federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states. 1
Similarly, in the spending power context, independent state consent would
be a necessary condition to the creation of federal jurisdiction over private
damage suits in federal court."' Where there is no basis for state consent in
either statutory waiver, individual appearance, or in the state's constitution,
state consent must be implied from independent state action: voluntary
acceptance of federal funds provided in that spending package where the
state knows from the terms of the statute that Congress has authorized
federal jurisdiction over it in private damage suits arising out of that spending
package. 5 6 As suggested above, the difference in the modes of consent is

511. Skover, Phoenix Rising, supra note 16, at 301.
512. See supra notes 366-411 and accompanying text. One of the logical problems in an
implied waiver approach is the tension between the requirement of "express waiver" of eleventh
amendment immunity through state constitutional provision, and individual appearance in
federal court on the one hand, and the doctrine of "implied waiver" in the area of congressional
power to create federal jurisdiction over states on the other hand. However, "implied waiver"
doctrine for congressional power, and "express waiver" doctrine for state statutory, state
constitutional waiver, and individual appearance, are consistent inasmuch as both recognize the
independent power of a state to withhold consent.
513. See supra notes 366-411 and accompanying text (discussing how Parden, Employees and
Welch may be read to require state consent as independent predicate in eleventh amendment
analysis).
514. See supra notes 452-62 and accompanying text. Under implied waiver analysis, Pennsylvania in Union Gas II could not be held to have impliedly waived its eleventh amendment
immunity. Pennsylvania had been engaged in the clean-up of toxic waste long before the
Congress enacted the SARA Amendments (42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(D) and 9620(a)(1)) to the
Superfund Act. As Pennsylvania argued in its Supreme Court brief, the events on which liability
would be predicated occurred between 1960 and 1980. Main Brief of Pennsylvania, at 45. The
SARA Amendments were enacted in 1986. Pennsylvania could not thus have had any notice
of the possibility of private damage suit in federal court based on the Superfund Act, assuming
those amendments authorized private damage suits against states in federal court. Thus,
Pennsylvania could not have impliedly waived its eleventh amendment immunity on the facts
of Union Gas IL

515. See supra notes 412-62 and accompanying text (discussing how Atascadero and Edelman
suggest bilateral framework of clear congressional authorization and independent state consent).
516. See supra notes 459-62 and accompanying text (discussing Edelman's requirement that
state consent to congressionally authorized federal jurisdiction must be voluntary, and thus
independent of any congressional action).
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between the spending clause
explicable in terms of the essential difference
17
power and the commerce clause power.
Alternatively, the Court might go further and adopt an approach which
requires some form of express consent. Under an express waiver approach
to article I (either spending or commerce clause powers), a state must
expressly consent to be sued for damages by private plaintiffs in federal
court, before that federal court could exercise jurisdiction.
Perhaps an express state consent approach would solve Professor Tribe's
concerns over the implications of an implied waiver approach for eleventh
amendment issues of congressional power.51 8 He has argued that an implied
waiver approach, as outlined by Justices Marshall and Stewart in the Employees concurrence,5 19 would seem to "prove too much, '520 inasmuch as it
implicitly condoned the power of Congress to condition a state's entry into
an area subject to federal regulation on the state's waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity. Though this interpretation of the Employees concurrence is not the only one,52' there is that danger that implied waiver analysis
could slowly erode the voluntariness aspect of a state's independent consent.
Generally, the waiver of constitutional rights requires voluntariness. An
express state consent approach would mean that a state could never be
forced, theoretically or practically, to relinquish its eleventh amendment
immunity. This is true even if the state entered an area after Congress
authorized federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states. An
express state consent approach could also be justified in terms of the present
requirement that an express waiver of eleventh amendment immunity exist
in state statute or state constitution,5 22 or occur by the state's individual
appearance in federal court.5 23 In referring to waiver through state constitution or state statute, Atascadero stated that "we require an unequivocal
indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that
otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ' 524 Further, that
Parden made state consent a matter of federal law 52 does not necessarily
change the analysis, as independent state consent arguably has always been

517. See supra note 431 and accompanying text.
518. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 692-93.
519. 411 U.S. 279, 287-98 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
520. Tribe, supra note 6, at 692.
521. The Employees concurrence would seem open to another interpretation, however. Indeed,
if the concept of independent state consent in the Employees concurrence implied that state
action must be a "voluntary choice," then that concept would prevent Congress's attempt "to
condition" state action on the surrender of eleventh amendment rights, to the extent that the
state action in the circumstances was not voluntary. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 296 (Marshall
& Stewart, JJ., concurring in result).
522. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
523. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
524. 473 U.S. at 238 n.l. Pennsylvania has not expressly consented away its eleventh
amendment immunity in Union Gas I.
525. 377 U.S. at 196.
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a matter of federal constitutional law. Moreover, the Edelman Court's recent
clear language disfavoring "constructive consent" 5 2 in the eleventh amendment context supports express state consent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The "bilateral framework," an affirmative limitation on Congress's power
to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts over state government, has a firm
doctrinal foundation. It offers one approach for resolving eleventh amendment issues raised in the context of specific congressional grants of federal
jurisdiction over private damage suits against state government. In securing
for state government protection from compulsory private damage suit in
federal court (including those based on federal questions5 27 and brought by
in-state plaintiffs),5 2 the framework would satisfy a major constitutional
concern traceable to Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia 29 and
the unanimous Hans v. Louisiana30 decision. Growing out of the principle
that the eleventh amendment is a constitutional limitation on the grant of
judicial power in article III,53 ' the bilateral framework would protect the
states' immunity under the eleventh amendment from invasion by both
Congress and the federal judiciary. Thus, the bilateral framework would
bring a measure of logical strength and unity to eleventh amendment law.
The bilateral framework would not invalidate Congress's authorization of
private damage suits against states in federal court. Rather, in the absence
of independent state consent, it would deprive a federal court of original
jurisdiction over a state for private damage suits defined by the federal
statute at issue. Thus, by making independent state consent an essential
predicate of the analysis-congruent with the unanimous Hans Court,53 2 and
Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm before the eleventh amendment was
adopted"'-the framework operates as a jurisdictional limitation. However,
if state exposure to federal court jurisdiction presents significant federalism

526. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673. See also Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2945 (quoting Edelman, 415
U.S. at 673); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673).
527. See supra notes 148-215 and accompanying text (arguing that federal question damage
suits present same threat to integrity of state government as do state law based damage suits).
528. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (arguing that if the eleventh amendment
is viewed as state sovereignty principle bearing structural importance relating to integrity of
state government, distinction between out-of-state suits and in-state suits collapses).
529. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
530. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 234-61 and accompanying text.
532. See supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
533. See supra notes 234-61 and accompanying text (arguing that, despite the state-citizen
diversity clause of article III, sec. 2, independent state consent was the more fundamental
jurisdictional predicate that Justice Iredell was searching for in his dissent in Chisholm, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) at 429-50).
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problems, 534 the bilateral framework may significantly reduce that exposure.
In the absence of independent state consent, state courts would become
the primary fora for private damage suits against states under article I
statutes. Some may argue that the uniformity and consistency of federal law
would be jeopardized, since federal courts would be deprived of jurisdiction
over a certain class of federal cases. However, it should be said that all state
court decisions based on federal law are ultimately reviewable by the Supreme
Court. 535 Some may argue that the state judiciary is not up to the task of
hearing federally based private damage suits against states. However, state
courts are not generally the ineffective, insensitive institutions that some
critics have portrayed them to be.536 Moreover, an eleventh amendment based
affirmative limit on the commerce clause power would not promote
"lawlessness ' 537 in any sense of the word, as the eleventh amendment
probably does not prevent Congress from compelling state courts to hear
38
Further, state
certain federal causes of action against state government.
courts are bound under the Constitution to uphold federal law, even against
their own state governments. 539 As Justice Powell has recently noted, "[it

534. See Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 295 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result)
("Because of the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its
will in the courts of the other, a restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate .... ") (footnote omitted). In Welch, Justice Powell
emphasized this principle by adding the word "sensitive" and quoting directly from the

Employees concurrence. 107 S. Ct. at 2952-53.
535. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat), 264, 379-83, 407 (1821) (despite state claims of
sovereign immunity supremacy clause demands that federal issues be reviewable in Supreme
Court).
536. See Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States
in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1981). See also,
Salomine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical
Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONr. L.Q. 213 (1983); Note, State Incorporationof
Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J.
1144 (1985).
537. Justice Brennan has emphasized that current eleventh amendment doctrine will lead to
lawlessness. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor
Shapiro has made similar charges, see Shapiro, supra note 6, at 76.
538. Cf. Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 391 ("Whether state courts must
entertain all federally based suits remains an open question."). Though the eleventh amendment
does not apply to state courts, it is questionable whether Congress could, in an effort to
circumvent the eleventh amendment, create the possibility of substantial damage judgments
against state government, which the state courts would be bound to apply to the great detriment
of their own governments.
539. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (since federal law is supreme law of the land, state
courts are constitutionally obligated to enforce it, even if it contradicts or conflicts with state
policy). See also Employees, 411 U.S. at 298 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring in result)
("Missouri has courts of general jurisdiction competent to hear suits of this character, and the
judges of those courts are co-equal partners with the members of the federal judiciary in the
(footnote and citation omitted)
enforcement of federal law and the FederalConstitution ....
(emphasis added)).
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denigrates the judges who serve on the state40 courts to suggest that they will
5
not enforce the supreme law of the land.
Congress's power to create federal jurisdiction over state government under
the fourteenth amendment enforcement provision is distinguishable from
Congress's power under article 1.541 For structural reasons, it is unlikely that
the framers intended the fourteenth amendment to negate a state's right to
consent to federal court jurisdiction over private damage suits against it,
where those civil rights concerns were not present; or as Justice Powell has
phrased it, Where the "usual constitutional balance ' ' 42 obtains. The bilateral
framework may present an opportunity for the Court to begin to fill out
Justice Powell's vision of the "usual constitutional balance."
While the Civil War amendments long have been held to have increased
the federal government's power over states, they should not be interpreted
as a basis on which to justify any expansion of federal power over states,
as Justice Rehnquist in Fitzpatrick so clearly implied. 43 The power that these
amendments confer on the federal legislature to create federal jurisdiction
over private damage suits against state government therefore should be used
wisely. It should be limited to the furtherance of those civil rights concerns
properly within the scope of those amendments. If those amendments become
the basis for any expansion of federal power over state government, the
framers' worst fears about the concentration of political power may be
realized; the federal government may no longer be a government of specific,
enumerated powers. If Congress can negate rights constitutionally guaranteed
to the states by the eleventh amendment, what other rights constitutionally
guaranteed to the states may Congress negate?
There can be no doubt that the framers of our Constitution were deeply
concerned about the concentration of power in governmental bodies, as their
fear of parliamentary tyranny is well documented. Likewise, there can be
no doubt that both Federalists and Anti-Federalists would be concerned by
the vastly expanded power of the federal government over the state governments in America today. Indeed, the structure of the federal union engaged
the passion and intellect of the framers of the Constitution 5" and the
participants in the stormy ratification debates as perhaps no other issue

540. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2. See also Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176 (Harlan,
J.,dissenting).
541. See supra notes 492-500 and accompanying text.
542. 473 U.S. at 242.
543. See supra notes 488-91 and accompanying text (discussing Fitzpatrick's holding that
Congress is on special ground when acting pursuant to the fourteenth amendment enforcement
power, and may create federal jurisdiction over private damage suits against states without
state's consent).
544. See J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1893). See also M. FARRAND,
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1922). See also DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES (Charles C. Tansill
ed. 1927).
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did.145 Our forebears recognized that the federal union's structure was not
only important as the basic framework for government, but also as the
ultimate foundation of individual liberty.5 46 Can it be supposed, therefore,
that the framers of the Civil War Amendments intended to remove all
possibility for a balance of power between the federal and state governments?
The relationship between the federal judiciary and the state governments,
and Congress's attempts to employ the federal judicial power against state
government, are important aspects of this balance of power. As the Court
has recently maintained in Atascadero, "our Eleventh Amendment doctrine
is necessary to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers
of the Constitution.

5 47

In the Supreme Court's view, the eleventh amend-

ment contributes to a balance of power between the federal and state
governments,5 4 and to a harmony of federal-state relations.5 49 In this author's
view, the bilateral framework would strengthen the eleventh amendment's
ability to contribute to a balance of power in the federal union, for the
fundamental reason that Congress could not then legislate the eleventh
amendment out of the Constitution.
More than an arcane provision in the Constitution, the eleventh amendment has an important place in the broader scheme of federalism, despite
the tenth amendment's demise in Garcia. Precisely because of the states'
loss of substantive protection under the tenth amendment, it may be argued
that nowhere in our history has the need for eleventh amendment protection
been greater. 5 0 In an era where the power of the federal government has
been vastly expanded at the expense of that of the states, the bilateral
framework would modulate, through the concept of independent state con-

545. See J. MAIN, THE ANITFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1961); Kenyon, Men
of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, THE WM.
& MARY Q., Vol. XII, No. 1, (1955). See THE FEDERALIST, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.) reprintedfrom the original text of Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison (1888).
546. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238-40 n.2. For an excellent discussion of why attention
to the structure of the federal union is vitally important, see Nagel, Federalism as Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 81.
547. 473 U.S. at 238 n.2.
548. Id.
549. The Supreme Court has recognized that compulsory private damage suits against state
government do "violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty." United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
550. It should be noted that the conclusions Professor Tribe reached about the eleventh
amendment were in a different context in which the states had some significant substantive
protection under the tenth amendment. He argued that "any congressional attempt to confer
jurisdiction and abrogate immunity must be reasonably ancillary to an otherwise valid substantive
exercise of federal lawmaking power." Tribe, supra note 6, at 697 (emphasis added). He also
argued that "a sufficiently 'drastic invasion of state sovereignty' could be invalidated notwithstanding even the clearest possible expression of congressional purpose, but any such invalidation
would rest ultimately on tenth rather than eleventh amendment grounds." Id. (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
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sent, the "sensitive""' and important federalism tensions which inevitably
arise when a federal court assumes jurisdiction over state government. By
limiting the states' exposure to federal court retroactive relief, the bilateral
framework would give the state treasuries-the heart of state governmentsa measure of fiscal security. A constitutional principle with such importance
to the American experiment in government ought to be secure against
congressional, as well as "judicial inroads." Under the Constitution, therefore, Congress may not "abrogate" a state's or the states' eleventh amendment immunity from compulsory private damage suits in federal courts in
an exercise of the commerce clause, as Union Gas 1,552 McVey,SI3 and
congressional supremacy more generally, have maintained.

551. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2953.
552. 832 F.2d at 1356.
553. 812 F.2d at 323.

